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THE "NEW" NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT IN
OPERATION: FIRST EIGHT MONTHS
WILLIAm B. LOCKEART*
T HIS paper is an interim report on the application of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947,' during its first eight months of opera-
tion.' It does not purport to be a critical analysis of the Act, nor to
consider and resolve all problems which may arise in its applica-
tion in the future. Excellent critical analyses of the Act are already
available. Rather, this study is primarily informative in character,
designed to direct attention to significant National Labor Rela-
tions Board and court decisions. Necessarily, such a report is
interim in nature, since the last word has not been said on many
of the issues decided by the Board and the lower federal courts.
Still, the current decisions applying the Act are significant, not
only because labor and management must take account of Board
and lower court determinations until reversed, but because the
;Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 141 et. seq. (Supp. 1947), here-
inafter referred to as LMRA. Title I, § 101, of LRMA is the National
Labor Relations Act as amended, consisting of 17 sections. In this study
references to Sections 1 through 17 will be to the National Labor Relations
Act [NLRA] as amended by LMRA, unless otherwise indicated. Refer-
ences to Sections 102 through 503 will be to the balance of LMRA. The
Act became effective on August 22, 1947.
2. Decisions of the National Labor Relations Board and the courts
netween August 22, 1947 and April 22, 1948, are considered, except for the
addition of brief references to a few important decisions handed down in May
after this paper was in the printer's hands.
3. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
(1947) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 274; Foley, Union
Unfair Labor Practices under the Taft-Hartley Act, (1947) 33 Va. L. Rev.
697; Sutherland, Reasons in Retrospect, (1947) 33 Corn. L. Q. 1; Van Arkle,
An Analysis of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Practicing Law
Institute, 1947) ; Notes (1947) 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67; (1947) 42 Ill. L. Rev.
444. Other more specialized critical studies are cited infra in connection with
the particular subject considered.
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Board's decisions may be final on many representation matters,4
and its policy determinations are given great weight even when
subject to judicial review.5
Board' and court decisions will be considered only insofar as
they relate to changes made by the amended Act or reflect changes
4. Only when an unfair labor practice order "is based in whole or in
part on facts certified" in a representation investigation does the Act provide
for judicial review of a representation decision. Section 9 (d) ; American
Federation of Labor v. NLRB, (1940) 308 U. S. 401; NLRB v. Falk
Corporation, (1940) 308 U. S. 453. The new act is identical with the origi-
nal NLRA in this respect, despite a proposal in the original House Bill
to authorize court review of certifications. See analysis and criticism of this
proposal in Minority Report, House Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 94
(1947). However, the Supreme Court has expressly left undecided the
possibility of limited review of certification decisions through the federal
courts' original jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Judicial Code. See
American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, (1940) 308 U. S. 401, 412; Inland
Empire Council v. Millis, (1945) 325 U. S. 697, 699-700. The lower courts
have divided on this question. See Annotation, 158 A. L. R. 1339, 1347 et seq.
There is also the possibility of judicial review under Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act unless the NLRA is construed to "preclude
judicial review." See 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. 1009 (Supp. 1947) ;
cf. United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, (C.C.A. 3d 1948) 166 F. 2d 457
(deportation order). In actions to enjoin application of the reporting and
non-communist oath provisions of the amended Act (see p. 665 infra), two
federal district courts have assumed jurisdiction to review Board action in
representation matters, but the Board's action was sustained in each case. Oil
Workers International Union v. Elliott, (N.D. Tex. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 942;
National Maritime Union v. Herzog, (D. Dist. of Col. 1948) 21 LRRM
(Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 2648.
5. Under the original NLRA this was not only true as to findings of
fact, on which the Board's findings were conclusive when "supported by
evidence" [Section 10 (e) (f)], but was also true with respect to policy
determinations more nearly approaching questions of "law." See, e.g., NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, (1944) 322 U. S. 111, 131 (board's determination as
to who are "employees" is to be "accepted if it has 'warrant in the record'
and a reasonable basis in law"); Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, (1944) 321
U. S. 702, 704 (remedy which will effectuate the purposes of the act is for
the Board to determine) ; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, (1944) 321
U. S. 678, 682 n. 1 (in reviewing unfair labor practice determination, the
Court points out that even on "questions of law, the experienced judgment of
the Board is entitled to great weight"). While Section 10 (e) and (f) of
the amended Act now make findings of fact conclusive only when "supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole," there is good
reason to believe that the Courts will continue to give substantial weight
to the policy determinations of the Board because of its experience and ex-
pertness in the field of industrial relations. Two Circuit Courts of Appeal
have agreed that this amendment will not result in review resembling a trial
de novo, but opinions differ as to whether in practice it will make any ma-
terial change in the scope of judicial review. See NLRB v. Austin Co.,
(C.C.A. 7th 1947) 165 F. 2d 592; NLRB v. Caroline Mills, (C.C.A. 5th
1948) 21 LRRf 2542.
6. Only the leading Board decisions will be cited on most points. A
considerable number of subsequent cases have been decided upon the authority
of the cited decisions. The full text of most decisions is not yet available.
The analysis herein is based, in the main, on the condensed reports appear-
ing in Labor Relations Reference Manual. All quotations are from the text
of the NLRB opinions.
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in policy attributable to the new legislation. They will be presented
in the following order: (1) Reporting and non-communist affi-
davit requirements. (2) The scope of the Act with respect to "em-
ployees" protected by it. (3) Representation proceedings and prob-
lems. (4) Unfair labor practices, including restrictions on union
security devices and the use of injunctions.7 Decisions concerned
only with those provisions of LMRA not related to the amended
NLRA will not be considered.8
LABOR ORGANIZATION REPORTS AND NoN-CoMMUNIST
AFFIDAVITS
In order to be entitled to specified benefits of the act, each labor
organization, and any national or international labor organization
with which it is affiliated, must file with the Board the so-called non-
communist affidavit executed by each officer, and must file with the
Secretary of Labor detailed reports concerning its organization,
officers, procedures and finances. No enforceable duty to file these
7. The impact of the amended Act on the jurisdiction of state labor
agencies over local industries affecting commerce will not be considered.
This has been the subject of able discussion elsewhere. Boudin, Supersedure
and the Purgatory Oath under the Taft-Hartley Law, (1948) 23 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rev. 72, 74-88; Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction
over Labor Relations, (1948) 46 Mich. L. Rev. 593; Note (1948) 15 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 362. Three cases have held the state agency is without jurisdiction in
representation matters when its exercise would conflict with policy established
by the NLRB. Linde Air Products Co. v. Johnson, (D. Minn. 1948) 21 LRRM
2272 (enjoined Minnesota agency from acting when NLRB had dismissed the
union's petition for non-compliance with reporting and non-communist oath
requirements); Eau Claire Press Co., (Wis. Employment Rel. Board 1947)
21 LRRMf 1085 (similar ruling); United Office Workers v. Smiley, (M.D.
Pa. 1948) 22 LRRM 2014 (enjoined state agency from establishing state-wide
bargaining unit when NLRB had ruled against other state-wide units for
same company in favor of nation-wide unit). In cases arising under the
original act, the Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have dis-
agreed on whether the state agency has jurisdiction in representation
cases when there is no conflict of policy and NLRB has not exercisedjurisdiction. Pittsburgh Railways Co., etc., Employees v. Division 85,
(1947) 357 Pa. 379, 54 A. 2d 891 (denies jurisdiction) ; La Crosse Tel. Corp.
v. Wis. Employment Rel. Board, (1947) 251 Wis. 583, 30 N. V. 2d 241
(affirms jurisdiction). The latter case is pending in the U. S. Supreme Court
which has postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits.
See (1948) 16 Law Week 3314.
8. There have been only three such decisions. Section 304 forbidding
political contributions or expenditures by a labor organization was held to
violate the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment. United States v.
CIO, (D. Dist. of Col. 1948) .... F. Supp ..... 21 LRRM 2451. The appeal
has already been submitted on oral arguments to the Supreme Court
See (1948) 16 Law Week 3327. Two strikes have been enjoined under the
National Emergency powers pursuant to Section 208. United States v. Car-
bide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., (E.D. Tenn. 1948) 21 LRRM 2525 (Oak
Ridge Atomic Energy Laboratory) ; United States v. International Union,
United Mine Workers, (D. Dist. of Col. 1948) 21 LRRM 2570, 21 LRRM
2721, 22 LRRM 2005.
9. Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h).
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reports and affidavits is imposed, but the act provides that unless
they are filed:
(1) "No investigation shall be made by the Board of any ques-
tion . . . concerning the representation of employees, raised by a
labor organization. . ." pursuant to Section 9 (c).
(2) No petition by the labor organization for a union shop
election pursuant to Section 9 (e) shall be entertained by the Board.
(3) No complaint of an unfair labor practice shall be issued
by the Board on a charge made by the labor organization."
Effect of Non-Compliance in Representation Proceedings
In three major decisions the Board gave sweeping scope to the
provision that no investigation shall be made of a representation
question raised by a non-complying labor organization. It first
ruled that it would hold no election to determine the bargaining
representative on petition of a non-complying labor organization,
and, after giving a reasonable opportunity to comply, dismissed
such a petition even though filed prior to the effective date of the
Act. 1 The board reasoned that the ban on "investigation" of a
representation question applied not only to initiating an investiga-
tion, but also to continuing one after the effective date of the Act.
It next ruled that though the petition for an election was filed by a
complying labor organization an intervening union which had not
complied was not entitled to a place on the ballot.' 2 Finally, it ruled
that even when the petition for an election was filed by the em-
ployer, a non-complying labor organization could not be placed
on the ballot." In that case a complying union, which also claimed
to represent the employees, was placed alone on the ballot; in a later
case in which the sole union claiming recognition was not in com-
pliance, the Board dismissed the employer's petition for an elec-
tion.'4
10. These sanctions appear in substantially identical language in Sec-
tions 9 (f) and (h), which require the original detailed reports and affidavits
respectively. Section 9 (g), requiring annual reports, is substantially the same
as to the last two sanctions, but the first sanction is stated differently and
provides merely that a non-complying labor organization "shall not be
eligible for certification . . . as the representative of any employees." Other
verbal differences are pointed out in Note (1947) 42 Ill. L. Rev. 487, 488.
11. Rite-Form Corset Co., (1947) 75 NLRB 174, 21 LRRM 1011.
12. Sigmund Cohn Mfg. Co., (1947) 75 NLRB 177, 21 LRRM 1015.
A similar ruling was approved April 13th by a three judge court in National
Maritime Union v. Herzog, (D. Dist. of Col. 1948) 21 LRRM 2648, 2653.
13. Herman Loewenstein, Inc., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 47, 21 LRRM
1032.
14. Remington Rand, Inc., (1947) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Lab. Rel. Ref.
Man.) 47.
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In the first two cases the representation question was directly
raised with the Board by a non-complying labor organization as
petitioner or intervenor, and any investigation of a question so
raised was expressly forbidden by the Act. But in the third case,
the non-complying union contended that the representation ques-
tion was not "raised by a labor organization" but by the employer,
and hence the Board was free to proceed with a full investigation
and to place the non-complying union on the ballot. The Board
replied that the representation question was "raised by a labor
organization" within the meaning of the Act when the union made
a demand on the employer for recognition. It pointed out that while
the employer's petition set the machinery in motion, the "labor or-
ganization's initial claim for recognition . .. makes it possible for
the employer to invoke that machinery," and added that Sections
9 (f) and (h) speak "in terms of questions raised, rather than
petitions filed, by labor organizations." Recognizing that the lan-
guage of the Act provided "no sure answer," the Board sought
further support for its position by falling back on the "supervening
policy of denying the imprimatur of Government to such labor
organizations."15 After stating that the issue was one not only of
law, but also of policy, the Board announced broadly:
"We construe the amended Act to provide, in essence, that a
non-complying labor organization shall not be the beneficiary of
any Board investigation of a question concerning representation." 6
In an earlier opinion of less permanent significance, the Board
had also fallen back on a similar broad conclusion with respect to
the policy of the act. It refused to certify a non-complying labor
organization which had won a representation election prior to the
effective date of the act, and ordered the investigation closed.17
The union contended that the investigation was completed prior to
the effective date, and that after the election was won certification
was a purely ministerial act and no part of the investigative proce-
dure. To this the Board ruled that certification was "the final step"
in investigations conducted pursuant to Section 9 (c).' 8 But it
15. Herman Loewenstein, Inc., note 13 supra, 21 LRRM 1033.
16. Id. at 1032.
17. Myrtle Desk Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 29, 21 LRRM 1021. A
Federal District Court took a similar view when it refused, on petition
of a non-complying union, to order NLRB officials to count the ballots cast
at an election held prior to the effective date. Oil Workers International
Union v. Elliott, (N.D. Tex. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 942. The court ruled that it
had power to review the action of the Board on a petition for a mandatory
injunction. But see note 4 supra.
18. 21 LRRM 1021. The Board did not note the fact that Section 9 (g)
forbids "certification" of a union which fails to file the required annual re-
1948]
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buttressed this reasoning with the following broad conclusion:
"Despite some ambiguity, moreover, we believe that Subsec-
tions 9 .(f), (g) and (h), taken as a whole, reflect an intention on
the part of Congress completely to debar non-complying unions
from access to the Board's processes in representation cases."' 19
The Board has ruled, however, that a certification made prior to the
effective date of the act will not be disturbed for failure to comply, 20
though, as will be seen later, the employer will not be required to
bargain collectively with the non-complying certified labor organiza-
tion.
21
The practical result of these rulings is to recognize a new and
broad Congressional policy denying the aid of the Board to non-
complying labor organizations as paramount to the basic Congres-
sional policy to recognize and protect the right of employees to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.2 '
The latter policy could have remained paramount, had the Board
given the term "raised by a labor organization" a restrictive inter-
pretation, limiting it to the case in which the labor organization
itself seeks the aid of the Board by petition or intervention. Whether
it has correctly interpreted the will of Congress remains to be de-
termined,'2 3 either by Court decision 24 or Congressional action. It
ports, whereas Sections 9 (f) and (g), here involved, merely forbid "investi-
gation" of a representation question. See note 8 supra. It might be urged
that since Congress indicated a distinction between certification and investiga-
tion, the Board should not read the latter as including the former. However,
the Report of the Conference Committee gives no indication that any differ-
ence in the sanction was intended for annual as distinct from the original
reports or affidavits. See House Report No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1947) p. 51.
19. 21 LRRM 1021.
20. R. J. Freezer & Sons, Inc., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 75, 21 LRRM
1064.
21. See p. 673 infra.
22. See Sections 1 and 7.
23. The Board recognized it was forced to choose between conflicting
policies (see Herman Loewenstein, Inc., supra note 13, 21 LRRM at 1033),
but did not expressly indicate the policy basis for its choice as distinct from
the above-stated interpretation of the stautory terms. The reporting re-
quirements could hardly be thought paramount to the basic policy of the Act,
but the evident purpose of the affidavit requirement to eliminate Communist
officers from labor organizations may well have been intended by Congress to
take first place in case of conflict. That this purpose was prominent in the
Board's deliberations seems indicated by its express reliance on this purpose
in one of its first rulings under the amended Act. See Northern Virginia
Broadcasters, (1947) 75 NLRB No. 2, 20 LRRM 1319, considered p. 669
infra. Compare the emphasis on this purpose in National Maritime Union v.
Herzog, (D. Dist. of Col. 1948) 21 LRRM 2648 passim.
24. The issue could be raised by judicial review of an unfair labor
practice order based on a certification of a complying union which won an elec-
tion from which a non-complying union was excluded. Other possible avenues
of review are suggested note 4 supra.
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might be pointed out, however, that the first report of the Con-
gressional Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations indi-
cated no dissatisfaction with the Board's decisions on this matter.25
In a fourth major decision on the effect of non-compliance on
representation questions, the Board ruled that a non-complying
union, presently certified, would be placed on the ballot when the
employees petitioned for a decertification election.2 1 It reasoned
that to hold otherwise would confer on non-complying unions "the
power to immunize themselves against decertification" by their re-
fusal to comply with the act, and thus encourage non-compliance
contrary to the Congressional purpose. The Board ruled that the
representation question was "raised" by individual employees, not
by a labor organization. Certainly the union, which was already
certified, was not raising the question of decertification! If the
union lost the election it would lose its certification, but the Board's
opinion indicated that even if it won the union would still lose its
certification, unless it had brought itself into compliance. The
Board stated that in the absence of compliance it would "only
certify the arithmetical results of the election. ' 2 7 The result of such
arithmetical certification would be to inform the employer that a
majority of his employees still wished the union to represent them,
and he would be free to bargain with it, but under no enforceable
obligation to do so.2
-
While the ban on direct Board aid to a non-complying labor or-
ganization cuts deeply, a number of limitations and means of avoid-
ing it have been recognized when the non-complying union is not
directly involved.
In one of its first rulings under the new Act the Board held that
AFL was not a "national or international labor organization" re-
quired by the Act to comply before an "affiliate or constituent unit"
could petition for an election.29 The Board reasoned that in "ordi-
25. See Sen. Rep. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948) pp. 10-16.
26. Harris Foundry and fachine Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 14, 21
LRRM 1146. Section 9 (c) (1) (A) (ii) provides for an election to deter-
mine whether the union "which has been certified or is being currently recog-
nized by their employer as the bargaining representative" is still desired as the
representative by a majority of the employees. Considered pp. 709-12 infra.
27. 21 LRRAM 1147. The Board has consistently adhered to this polic3
since its announcement in February, 1948. See e.g., Burry Biscuit Corp.,(1948) 76 NLRB No. 98, 21 LRRM 1229; Colonial Hardware Flooring Co.,(1948) 76 NLRB No. 150, 21 LRRM 1281.
28. As indicated p. 673 infra, the Board has ruled that even when
it properly has jurisdiction it will not order an employer to bargain with
a non-complying labor organization, though it represents a majority of
the employees.
29. Northern Virginia Broadcasters, (1947) 75 NLRB No. 2, 20
LRRM 1319.
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nary labor relations parlance" the term "national and international
labor organization" means the "autonomous, self-governing units
of the labor movement" in various crafts, trades and industries, and
does not include the CIO and AFL which are "federations" of the
national and international organizations." It also urged that this
interpretation would more nearly effectuate the Congressional pur-
pose "to eliminate Communist influence from the labor movement,"
since if the federations were required td comply, and did not do so.
there would be no incentive for the local and national organizations
to rid themselves of Communist officers.3 1
This restrictive interpretation of the ban on permitting a com-
plying local to use the Board processes when its national was not
in compliance may have suggested the possibility of attempting the
reverse-a complying national seeking recognition when its local
had not complied. At any rate, such an attempt was successful. The
petition of a complying national labor organization, the United
Auto Workers, for an election in which it would be named on the
ballot as bargaining representative was granted over the objection
that its non-complying local union was chartered by the petitioner
and admitted to membership employees of the employer involved. -
The Board simply ruled that the compliance status of the local was
not in issue, because the petition was filed by the national organiza-
tion. Such a ruling would seem to permit the complying national
to by-pass the local, at least formally, secure certification itself,
and still lean on the local for advice and support. Indeed, in a
later case the Board rejected the contention that the petition of the
national should be dismissed on the claim that the non-complying
local was "the true bargaining agent," ruling that the local's com-
pliance was not in issue since it was not the petitioner.33 It may be
doubted, however, whether the Board would take the same position
if it became apparent that the national was simply fronting for the
30. Id. at 1321.
31. Id. at 1322.
32. Warshawsky & Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 159, 21 LRRM 1137.
33. Lion Oil Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 88, 21 LRRM 1220; cf. Granite
Textile Mills, 76 NLRB No. 93, 21 LRRM 1216. The Lion case may be
explained on quite a different ground for which it was later cited-the issue
of compliance is an administrative matter for the Board to decide, not a
matter for litigation in a representation hearing. See Electrical Equipment
Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 155, 21 LRRM 1285. Accord: Baldwin Locomotive
Works (1948) 76 NLRB No. 124, 21 LRRM 1263; cf. Beattie Mfg. Co.,
(1948) 77 NLRB No. 55, 22 LRRM 1015 (representation petition need not
allege compliance). The Board has likewise ruled that it will not consider at-
tacks on the truth of the non-communist affidavits, leaving this to the De-
partment of Justice. Craddock Terry Shoe Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 120,
21 LRRM 1194.
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non-complying local which was, in fact and in practice, the true
bargaining representative.
An analogous case in point arose as a sequel to a Board ruling
that the reporting and affidavit requirements apply only to labor
organizations, not to individual employees petitioning for decertifi-
cation of the bargaining representative. In the first ruling, the
Board held that failure of a petitioning employee to file the non-
communist affidavit was no bar to the decertification election for
which he petitioned . '1 In the sequel, the Board ruled that a former
union member and officer, seeking certification as an individual
bargaining representative, was barred from the ballot because she
was, in fact, "acting as an agent of" a non-complying labor or-
ganization., The Board's careful consideration of the evidence
indicates that it would have permitted the individual to appear
on the ballot, despite her former union connections, had it been
convinced that she was acting independently and not as the agent
for the non-complying union. The same principle would seem to
apply to a national or international union fronting for a local,
though it would appear more difficult to prove that a national is
acting for a local rather than on its own behalf.
The mere fact that a non-complying labor organization may
have encouraged employees to request Board action on their own
behalf as individuals is not, in itself, a bar. A certified labor organi-
zation charged at a hearing on an employees' decertification peti-
tion that a non-complying union had instigated the filing of the
petition and was in fact the true petitioner. The Board found "no
merit" in this contention, ruling that the desires of the employees
could best be ascertained by ordering an election."6 The reason for
throwing off this contention as without merit may have been that
it was not substantiated, or that the Board was simply pursuing
its usual policy of treating non-compliance as an administrative
matter not to be litigated at representation hearings. 37 Also, the
Board must have had evidence indicating that at least 30% of the
employees were dissatisfied with the certified representative, 8 and
hence an election was called for regardless of who may have in-
34. Acme Boot Mfg. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 62, 21 LRRM 1198.
Accord: Free Press Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 152, 21 LRRM 1283. But cf.
an administrative ruling that a committee of three employees who claim to
represent their fellow workers constitute a labor organization, and must file
the reports and non-communist affidavits. General Motors Corp., (May 10,
1948) 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 9.
35. Campbell Soup Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 133, 21 LRRM 1261.
36. Whitin Machine Works, (1948) 76 NLRB No. 143, 21 LRRM 1269.
37. See note 33 supra.
38. See. p. 710 infra.
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stigated the employees to petition. At any rate, the result of the
case would seem to be that a non-complying union can undertake
to organize the employees to the point where, through them, it can
bring about a decertification election to vote out the certified union,
thus leaving the non-complying union free to seek recognition.
Can the foregoing cases be considered authority for permitting
a non-complying union to cause a sympathetic and loyal member
to petition for certification as individual bargaining representative
of his fellow employees, so long as no control is retained over him
as its agent? Or for permitting a non-complying union to cause a
member to file charges of employer discrimination because of union
membership? Although in the suggested cases the issues are quite
different from those in a decertification petition, there is a close
resemblance in that the non-complying union encourages but is not
a party to the proceedings and will benefit indirectly by its suc-
cess. At any rate, the Acme Boot, Whitin Machine and Campbell
Soup cases, cited in the foregoing paragraphs, appear to indicate
a Board pattern which distinguishes between action by individual
employees, possibly encouraged by union relationships, and action
by the non-complying labor organization itself or persons actually
acting for it.
In one situation only has a non-complying labor organization
been recognized as having any rights in a representation proceed-
ing. This is when it seeks to establish an existing collective bargain-
ing contract as a bar to an election. The Board recognizes an exist-
ing collective bargaining contract as a bar to election of another
representative for a contract period not to exceed two years.? Not
only does it make this protection available to the non-complying
union with a valid collective bargaining agreement, but it has ruled
that the union may also present evidence at the representation hear-
ing on the issue as to the appropriate bargaining unit. The Board
39. Early in 1947 the Board ruled that a two year collective bargaining
contract, whose expiration date was not imminent, would bar an election even
though a contract of such length was not customary in the industry. Reed
Roller Bit Co., (1947) 72 NLRB 927. On August 21, 1947, it made three
important rulings further broadening such a contract bar. It ruled: (1) A
four year contract, unreasonable in duration, is a bar for its first two years.
Puritan Ice Co., (1947) 74 NLRB 1311. (2) A contract of indefinite duration,
with power to reopen, is a bar for its first two years. Filtrol Corp., (1947) 74
NLRB 1307. (3) Such a contract, with a provision for renegotiation of
wages, hours and working conditions, which was actually reopened to re-
negotiate such matters, is still a bar for the two year period. S and W Fine
Foods, Inc., (1947) 74 NLRB 1316; Puritan Ice Co., supra; Filtrol Corp.,
supra. The underlying thesis of these decisions was that greater stability
of the collective bargaining relationship could thus be encouraged without
sacrificing needed flexibility in the substantive terms of the contract.
[Vol. 32:663
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reasoned that the defense of the collective bargaining contract
necessarily entails the defeat of the petition seeking to alter the
bargaining unit covered by the contract.40 The effect, however, may
well be much broader than protection of the contract, for a favor-
able decision to retain a plant-wide bargaining unit, rather than to
permit craft units to be broken off, will leave the non-complying
industrial union in a stronger position even after expiration of the
contract.
Effect of Non-compliance on Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings
The express provisions of Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) make it
clear that no Board complaint will be issued on an unfair labor
practice charge filed by a non-complying labor organization. But
how about the complaints issued prior to the effective date of the
Act on charges filed by such unions? Or charges filed by individual
employees who are members of non-complying unions? The Act
does not expressly forbid Board relief in either of these situations.
In the former, partial relief only has been given the non-complying
union. In the latter, there are no decisions, but the regulations of
the Board permit filing of charges by any individual without refer-
ence to union affiliation,41 and the General Counsel's office has de-
clared that it is acting on charges filed by individuals despite their
membership in a non-complying union.42 The decisions on the first
class of case should provide some light on the probable disposition
of this latter class.
In brief summary, when the complaint was issued before the
effective date on the charge of a non-complying union, the Board
will refuse to require collective bargaining with the non-complying
union but will give relief against other unfair labor practices. The
leading case is Marshall & Bruce Company, decided in October,
1947 The employer had refused to bargain with a certified union.
40. American Chain and Cable Co., (NLRB, 1948) 21 LRRM 1269;
Marine Iron and Bldg. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 112, 21 LRRM 1258; cf.
Baldwin Locomotive Works, (1948) 76 NLRB No. 124, 21 LRRM 1263
(limiting to contract issue held not prejudicial since union's offer of proof
and its brief fully explored issues) ; Borg-Warner Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB
No. 136, 21 LRRM 1271 (same); Newark Transfoiming Co., (1948) 76
NLRB No. 145, 21 LRRM 1280 (limiting to contract issue is proper where
that is the sole issue involved). In the Baldwin Locomotive and Newark
Transforming cases the Board stated that the non-complying union with a
contract was entitled to present evidence on all relevant issues, without any
indication that it would be limited to the issue of an appropriate unit or other
issues having some bearing on the effect of the contract.
41. See NLRB-Procedures, § 202.2, (1947) 12 Fed. Reg. 5651, 20
LRRM 3107.
42. See (1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 161.
43. (1947) 75 NLRB 90, 21 LRRM 1001.
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The Board ordered the employer to bargain but conditioned its
order upon the union complying with the reporting and affidavit
requirements within 30 days. It reasoned as follows: (1) The obli-
gations of employers which arose under the original Act continue
in effect despite the changes in the amended Act. They are "liabili-
ties" within the meaning of general savings statute4 which prevents
extinguishment of liabilities under a repealed statute unless the
repealing statute expressly so provides. The Board noted that not
only was no provision made in the Act for absolving employers of
liabilities for their unfair labor practices prior to the amendment,
but the legislative history shows that a proposal to do so was re-
jected.45 (2) Hence, the Board had the "power" to issue the usual
remedial order requiring the employer unconditionally to bargain
with the union. On these points the Board was unanimous." (3)
Relying on the Board's discretion to issue such remedial orders as
will "effectuate the policies of the Act," a majority of three ruled
that the Congressional policy would not be effectuated by a bar-
gaining order which would place the non-complying union "in the
position of a newly certified bargaining representative." It reasoned
that to require an employer to bargain with a union "is often tanta-
mount in practice to a certification" because it looks to a future
relationship. It could not believe that Congress would have intended
the Board to require an employer to bargain in the future with a
union which it now lacked the authority to certify. Again the Board
fell back on the broad policy conclusion already noted in the repre-
sentation decisions:
"We are convinced that Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) not only
provide procedural limitations upon the Board's power to act with
respect to cases arising after the effective date of the amendment,
but also embody a public policy denying utilization of the Board's
processes directly to aid the bargaining position of a labor organiza-
tion which has failed to comply with the 'foregoing Sections."47
Not only has the Board consistently adhered to this decision, but
its position has been approved and followed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit. In that case the Board had issued a
collective bargainirig order in 1946, and later petitioned the court
for an order enforcing it. The union had not yet complied with the
reporting and affidavit requirements. The court's order enforcing
44. 16 Stat. 431 (1871), 1 U. S. C. 29 (1940).
45. 21 LRRM 1002. The Board's reasoning with respect to the effect
of the general savings statute was quoted with approval in NLRB v. National
Garments Co., (C.C.A. 8th 1948) 166 F. 2d 233, 236-7.
46. 21 LRRM 1003.
47. Ibid.
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the Board order was conditioned upon compliance by the Union
within 30 days. The court reasoned that "since enforcement by the
court of the order to bargain looks to the future, the policy evi-
denced by sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) precludes enforcement un-
less the union shall comply with the requirements of those sec-
tions."4 8
In these decisions the Board and the court are both ruling that
there is no enforceable duty to bargain with a non-complying union,
because that would bring about a result contrary to the policy of
Congress. Exactly the same reasoning would seem to apply if the
issue should arise on a complaint issued pursuant to a charge of an
individual employee, for the only remedial order the Board could
issue would be one requiring the employer to bargain with the non-
complying union. This it has clearly indicated it will not do.
In a companion decision to the Marshall case, the Board adhered
to the basic policy first announced in the Mfarshall opinion, and
entered an order aimed at interference and coercion in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) and discrimination in violation of Section 8 (a)
(3), even though the charges were filed by a non-complying union. 49
Of course, the complaints had been issued prior to the effective date
of the act. The Board ordered reinstatement and back pay for the
employee discriminated against, and the usual cease and desist
orders. This policy has been adhered to consistently in cases not
involving an order for collective bargaining.
The courts have also sustained this position of the Board in
cases not involving a collective bargaining order. Board orders,
arising out of charges made by non-complying unions, have been
enforced by two Circuit Courts of Appeal, in cases involving inter-
ference and coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and dis-
crimination in violation of Section 8 (a) (3). Both cases involved
orders of reinstatement as well as cease and desist orders. In both
cases the Board order itself was entered prior to the effective date,
but the reasoning of the courts would not have required a different
result so long as the complaint was issued prior to that date. In one
case, it was contended that the Board's petition for enforcement
48. NLRB v. Brozen, (C.C.A 2d 1948) 166 F. 2d 812, 813. It might
be noted that the decision was not contested in this respect, for the Board
requested this change to be made in its order and the union was not
represented. Cf. Fulford v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., (Ind. App. 1948)
77 N. E. 2d 755, ruling that an employer has no duty under NLRA
to bargain with a non-complying union, and hence had not failed to comply
with "any obligation imposed by law" within the meaning of a state in-junction statute.
49. O'Keefe & Merritt Mfg. Co., doing business as Pioneer Electric
Co., (1947) 75 NLRB 117, 21 LRRM 1006.
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of its order was the equivalent of a complaint, but the court ruled
that the complaint referred to in Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) was
only the Board's procedural step for commencement of an unfair
labor practice proceeding, and that this had taken place prior to
the effective date of the act.50 The other court concurred in this
reasoning, and also relied upon the general savings statute which
the Board had indicated in the Marshall. & Bruce case would pre-
serve rights and liabilities already accrued by unfair labor practices
in violation of the original act.51
Do these cases shed any light on the probable results of a
charge filed by an employee-member of a non-complying union
charging the employer with interference and coercion in the exer-
cise of employee's rights and discrimination because of union mem-
bership? They indicate that the Board and the courts are willing
to protect employees against such unfair labor practices, even
though the non-complying union which filed the charges will bene-
fit indirectly in the encouragement to organizational and other
union activity which such orders would provide, and in the credit
which the union may receive for obtaining the relief. Such indirect
benefit was not considered contrary to the policy of Congress, and
the procedure was within the letter of the law since the complaints
were issued prior to the effective date. When the complaint is
issued after the effective date, but on a charge filed by an employee
individually rather than the union, the procedure is equally within
the law and the indirect benefit to the union is no greater, and
possibly less, since it will receive no credit for obtaining the relief.
The Board, it is suggested, reached the outermost limit of its
broad policy argument when it decided in the Marshall case that
Congressional policy prevented use of the Board's processes "di-
rectly to aid the bargaining position" of the non-complying union. -2
Indirectly strengthening the union through preventing coercion,
interference and discrimination against individual employees and
union members seems too far removed from direct aid to the bar-
gaining position to fall within the condemnation of Congressional
policy.
Constitutionality of Non-Communist Oath Requirement
The Board has consistently refused to consider the constitution-
ality of the non-communist oath requirement. Its position has been
that it is inappropriate for the Board, as an administrative agency,
50. NLRB v. Whittenburg, (C.C.A. 5th 1947) 165 F. 2d 102, 104-5.
51. NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., (C.C.A. 6th 1948) 166 F. 2d 485, 488.
52. Seep. 674 supra.
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to pass upon questions regarding the constitutionality of Congres-
sional enactments.5 3 Two federal district courts have sustained the
constitutionality of the requirement, the last one being a special
three-judge court in the District of Columbia."
No attempt will be made to consider the opinions of these two
lower courts. The constitutional issues have been thoroughly dis-
cussed elsewhere.55 It might merely be pointed out that there is no
assurance of an early Supreme Court decision on this issue, as it
might well be ruled that the District of Columbia court had no
jurisdiction to pass on the matter in a suit to enjoin enforcement
of the reporting and affidavit requirements in view of the provi-
sions of the Act with respect to judicial review.58
SCOPE OF THE ACT WITH RESPECT TO "EMPLOYEES" COVMum
Two major changes were made with respect to employees pro-
tected by the act. Section 2 (3) excluded "any individual employed
as a supervisor" and "any individual having the status of an inde-
pendent contractor" from "employees." These changes were the
Congressional response to Supreme Court decisions which had held
that foremen were entitled to organize and bargain collectively
under the protection of the act 7 and that small business men, such
as newsboys, might properly be considered "employees" when their
economic status more nearly resembled employment than inde-
pendent business.5 5
Who Are Supervisors?
The Act defines supervisors, now excluded from its benefits, as
follows:
"The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
53. See, e.g., Rite-Form Corset Co., (1947) 75 NLRB 174, 21 LRRM
1011, 1012.
54. Oil Workers International Union v. Elliott, (N.D. Tex. 1947) 73
F. Supp. 942; National Maritime Union v. Herzog, (D. Dist. of Col. 1948)
21 LRRM 2648. In the latter case one judge dissented from dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that evidence should be taken as to the nature
of the Communist party to determine whether the Congressional abridgment
of freedom of speech was justified.
55. Boudin, Supersedure and the Purgatory Oath under Taft-Hartley
Law, (1948) 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 72; Barnett, Constitutionality of the
Expurgatory Oath Requirement of the LMRA, 1947, (1947) 27 Ore. L. Rev.
85; Cox, supra note 3, at 35, n. 148; Notes, (1948) 48 Col. L. Rev. 253;
(1947) 42 Ill. L. Rev. 487, 490.
56. See note 4 supra.
57. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, (1947) 330 U. S. 485. See
Cox, supra note 3 at 4.
58. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, (1944) 322 U. S. 111. See Cox,
supra note 3 at 5.
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ployees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their griev-
ances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing, the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judg-
ment." 59
No consideration will be given to the numerous decisions applying
this definition to employees clearly falling within or without its
terms, but it should be noted that the requisites are stated, and ap-
plied, in the alternative. For example, responsibility to direct em-
ployees, if it requires the use of independent judgment, is sufficient
to classify an employee as a supervisor even though he has no
authority to hire, discharge, etc., or to recommend such action.,,
Similarly, authority of an inspector to recommend dismissal of an
employee for defective work is sufficient, even though he has no
responsibility to direct the employee's work.61
In addition to the duties clearly specified in the definition, the
Board has stressed the following factors in finding particular em-
ployees to be supervisors: (1) Assignment of work to production
employees by working foremen with responsibility for their out-
put.6 2 However, merely handing out work under the supervision
of a general foreman is not alone enough.8 3 (2) Authority to select
employees for overtime work.6 4 (3) Authority to criticize work of
employees and report on their performance to the head of the de-
partment.65 (4) Authority to send an unwilling employee back to
the employer's office. 66
In three cases the Board has ruled that infrequent or sporadic
supervision will not justify classification of the employee as a super-
visor. In the clearest case, the Board ruled that a production em-
ployee who acted as a substitute foreman for approximately one
month out of twelve was not a supervisor.67 The opinion does not
intimate how much more than one-twelfth of the time the employee
must have supervisory rank before he will be classified as a super-
visor. Might the Board possibly adopt the 50% rule it has applied
59. Section 2 (11).
60. See, e.g., Farmville Mfg. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 34, 21 LRRM
1186; American Sugar Refining Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 146, 21 LRRM%
1270.
61. General Electric Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 142, 21 LRRM 1279.
62. Steelweld Equipment Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 116, 21 LRRM
1252; cf. American Sugar Refining Co., supra note 60 (general supervision
and responsibility for output).
63. S-P Mfg. Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 83, 21 LRRM 1070.
64. Steelweld Equipment Co., supra note 62.
65. Ibid.
66. Farmville Mfg. Co., supra note 60 (classified as "discipline").
67. Ironton Fire Brick Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 108, 21 LRRM 1241.
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in the case of guards?6s Another case involved an attempt to
classify 11 out of 21 warehouse employees as supervisors because
each headed up a one-man department, such as shipping or receiv-
ing, and on occasional rush periods received assistance from other
employees whom he would then supervise. On such occasions about
20% of his time would be devoted to supervision. The Board ruled
that the supervisory authority was "exercised too sporadically to
warrant supervisory classification.6 ' There is no intimation, how-
ever, that a working foreman who regularly devotes 20% of his
time to supervision and the rest to personal production would not
be classified as a supervisor. The stress was laid, not upon any
regular time ratio between supervision and production, but upon
the absence of any supervisory authority during most of the time.7
Indeed, the Board decisions hold that the working foreman whc
does manual work right along with his crew will be classified as a
supervisor if he has supervisory authority, without giving any con-
sideration to the proportion of his time devoted strictly to super-
visory duties.
71
The Board has ruled that inspectors in a manufacturing plant,
with authority to order machines shut down because of defective
work and thus to affect the earnings of production employees, are
not supervisors,72 but recognized that some inspectors may have
supervisory functions within the statutory definition. Its conclu-
sion that inspection alone, with authority to shut down machines,
was not a supervisory function was based largely on legislative
history rather than any detailed consideration of the statutory
terms. The opinion pointed out that inspectors had been expressly
included among supervisors in the bill as it passed the House but
excluded in the final bill, and their exclusion noted in the Confer-
ence Report.73 With such indication of legislative intent, inspec-
68. See p. 698 infra.
69. Fred H. Cole, doing business as Cole Instrument Co., (1947) 75
NLRB No. 44,21 LRRMI 1030.
70. Cf. Electric Auto-Lite Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 167, LRRM
1308 (sporadic, rare and infrequent nature of reports on employees' progress
stressed in finding group leaders and occasional instructors are not super-
visors).
71. Farmville 'Mfg. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 34, 21 LRRM 1186;
Steelweld Equipment Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 116, 21 LRRM 1252. The
board has also ruled that foremen "temporarily" demoted to production
employees because of a cut-back in production will not be excluded from a
bargaining unit as "supervisors," despite the employer's asserted intention
to restore them to supervisory positions on expansion of operations. Geneva
Forge, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 78, 21 LRRM 1206.
72. Clayton Mark & Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 33, 21 LRRM 1174.
73. Id. at 1175. See Conference Report, House Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong.
1st Sess. p. 35 (1947).
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tion duties alone could not be considered as including supervisory
functions. Subsequently, however, the Board gave supervisory
classification to an inspector who had authority effectively to recom-
mend dismissal of an employee because of defective work. 74 In the
absence of some such expressly enumerated supervisory power, in-
spectors will doubtless remain within the protection of the Act.
Whether they should be placed in a separate bargaining unit wil
be considered at a later point.
75
In a similar earlier case the Board ruled that time-study and
standards employees, whose principal function was to determine the
factual basis for an incentive wage plan, were not supervisors . 7
Here, also, the Board relied on a legislative history almost identical
with that of inspectors, the only variance being the reference in the
Conference Report to the possible classification of time-study per-
sonnel as "professional employees.
' 77
Effect of Excluding Supervisors from Protected Employees
The foregoing decisions were in representation proceedings, in
which the Board consistently excluded employees found to be
supervisors from any bargaining unit,7 8 thus effectively barring
them from representation by a statutory exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative.79 Likewise, in the unfair labor practice decisions, both
the Board and the courts have ruled that they will give supervisors
no protection against future employer practices such as refusal to
bargain, coercion, and discrimination.
All unfair labor practice decisions affecting supervisors have
thus far involved employer practices engaged in before the amend-
ment. Even in such cases the Act is now construed to foreclose
orders which restrain future employer conduct aimed at interfer-
ence with organization and bargaining of supervisors. The Board
has ruled that refusal of an employer to bargain with the certified
representative prior to the effective date will not now justify an
74. General Electric Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 142, 21 LRRM 1279.
75. See p. 700 infra.
76. Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 80,
21 LRRM 1066.
77. See Conference Report, supra note 73 at p. 35. Their classification
as professional employees is considered p. 690 infra.
78. Cf. Grede Foundries, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 181, 21 LRRM
1303 (challenge to supervisor's ballot sustained).
79. The Act does not prevent the supervisors and employer from vol-
untarily agreeing that the union certified for other employees may also rep-
resent the supervisors, but there is no compulsion to agree and no statutory
protection to such union as the exclusive representative of all supervisors.
See Section 14(a).
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order requiring future collective bargaining. 0 Likewise, reviewing
courts have set aside and refused to enforce Board orders, entered
prior to the effective date, which would have required collective
bargaining with the certified representative of supervisors after that
date.8' The reason given was that the order "if allowed to stand,
would operate in futuro in a manner contrary to the amended
statute," which makes it "unmistakably clear ... that ... Congress
intended to deny and has denied the benefits of the Act to 'super-
visors.' " " The Board has also ruled that an employer's coercion,
restraint and discrimination directed at supervisors prior to the
amended Act will not now justify an order forbidding future con-
duct of that character.8 3 Similarly, a reviewing court has refused to
enforce a pre-amendment Board order protecting supervisors
against future coercion, restraint and discrimination. 4 Exactly the
same principle has been applied with respect to other changes in the
Act. The courts have consistently refused to enforce Board orders,
proper when made, but requiring future conduct no longer con-
sistent with the amended Act.85
This does not mean that the courts will refuse to enforce orders
80. Westinghouse Electric Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB 1, 20 LRRM 1319;
Peoples Life Ins. Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 6, 20 LRRM 1329.
81. Young Spring and Wire Co. v. NLRB, (App. D.C. 1947) 163 F. 2d
905 (NLRB order set aside), cert. denied, sub. nom. Foreman's Ass'n of
Am. v. L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., (1948) 69 S. Ct. 607; NLRB v.
Wyandotte Transportation Co., (C.C.A. 6th 1948) 166 F. 2d 434, (court's
pre-amendment order enforcing NLRB order set aside).
82. Young Spring and Wire Co. v. NLRB, supra note 81 at 960-7.
83. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 182, 21
LRRIMf 1305 (board refused to decide alleged pre-amendment violation of
Section 8(a) (1), because it "cannot order respondent to cease and desist
from conduct wvhich would be lawful if engaged in now") ; Briggs Mfg. Co.,
(1947) 75 NLRB No. 65, 21 LRRM 1056; (board specifies that order for-
bidding discrimination in violation of Section 8(a) (4), though based on
pre-amendment discrimination against a supervisor, can only apply to em-
ployees as presently defined by the Act).
84. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 6th 1947) 20
LRRM 2582 (on rehearing, previous enforcement decree modified to ter-
minate on August 22, 1947), previous opinion, 162 F. 2d 864.
85. NLRB v. Atkins and Co., (C.C.A. 7th 1947) 165 F. 2d 659 (refusal
to enforce order to bargain with union admitting both guards and other
employees to membership; see p. 699 infra) ; NLRB v. Brozen, (C.C.A. 2d
1948) 166 F. 2d 812, 21 LRRMN 2340 (refusal to enforce order to bargain
with non-complying union; see p. 675 supra) ; NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron and
Brass Works. (C.C.A. 2d 1947) 165 F. 2d 660 (because of "free speech"
provision [8 (c)], order against coercion of employees was limited by in-
terpretation to permit statements derogatory to unions, short of orohibited
"threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit;" see p. 715 infra). On the
other hand. so long as the pre-amendment order is consistent with the Act
as amended, it is enforced. Ibid.; NLRB v. National Garment Co., (C.C.A.
8th 1948) 166 F. 2d 233, 236-37 (approving Board's analysis in Marshall and
Bruce case, p. 674 supra) ; NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., (C.C.A. 6th 1948)
166 F. 2d 485.
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corrective in nature, such as orders for reinstatement and back pay,
designed to remedy individual wrongs committed against super-
visors at a time when they were protected by the Act. The reason
for refusing to require an employer to refrain from future "unfair
labor practices," no longer unlawful when aimed at supervisors,
does not appear applicable to orders which only provide individual
relief for past wrongs. As to these liabilities to individuals, the
general savings statute invoked by the Board in the non-communist
affidavit cases would seem to apply. 6 While there are no direct
rulings ordering reinstatement of supervisors for pre-amendment
discrimination, a recent decision indicates that the Board would
give such relief in a proper case.87 There the Board dismissed a
charge of coercion of supervisors in violation of Section 8 (a) (1)
without considering its merits because the only "effective remedy"
would be a cease and desist order which could not now be made
since such conduct is no longer unlawful. In the same case it passed
on the merits of three charges of discrimination against super-
visors, though it found no violation. Had it not believed that rein-
statement and back pay for the supervisors would have been proper
in case the violation was made out, it would have dismissed the
charge in the same manner as it did the charge of coercion. In one
case the Supreme Court appears to have recognized this distinction
between correcting a past wrong to individual supervisors and pre-
venting future discrimination against them. On petition for cer-
tiorari, it refused to disturb that part of a pre-amendment enforce-
ment decree which ordered reinstatement and back pay for a fore-
man, but granted certiorari limited to that part of the decree which
required an employer to cease and desist from discouraging mem-
bership in the Foreman's Association in the future. The Court
vacated this latter part of the order, and remanded the cause to the
lower court to consider the effect of the amended Act.88 This same
distinction between corrective orders for reinstatement and pre-
ventative orders directed at future conduct in labor relations was
also noted by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in a case
involving the free speech amendment to the Act."'
One Board decision suggests the possibility of a significant
86. See p. 674 supra.
87. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 182, 21
LRRIM 1305.
88. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, (1947) 68 S. Ct. 262.
89. See NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works, (C.C.A. 2d 1947)
165 F. 2d 660, 662 (explained note 85, supra; the corrective portions of the
order, however, did not involve an amendment while the preventative por-
tion did).
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limitation on the exclusion of supervisors from the Act's protection.
An employer had induced a discharged foreman to withdraw a
pending unfair labor practice charge in order to secure reemploy-
ment. The Board ruled that he violated Section 8 (a) (4) because
the foreman was not yet a supervisor when the violation took place
but only an applicant for a supervisor's job.90 It reasoned that he
"did not acquire the status of a supervisory employee .. . until he
was hired after the discrimination which violated Section 8 (4)
took place." Instead, he "was a member of the working class when
he applied for the job," an "employee" within the broad definition
which does not require an employment relationship with the par-
ticular employer. Such reasoning, if followed, would give complete
protection against unfair labor practices directed at applicants for
supervisor's jobs, or, as in this case, directed at former super-
visors who apply for reinstatement after discharge. Possibly the
Board had some doubts about its own reasoning, for, it added, in
the alternative, that even though the applicant's status "be con-
sidered as supervisory because he was applying for a supervisory
job," supervisors were employees within the coverage of the Act
when the violation took place. Hence, on either basis, an order for-
bidding discrinination "against any employee because he has filed
charges ... under the Act" was proper because it would be limited
to such persons as are now within the definition of employee.
Exclusion of Independent Contractors from Protected Employees
In expressly excluding "any person having the status of an
independent contractor" from protected "employees" covered by
the amended Act,"' Congress demonstrated its dissatisfaction with
the decisions of the Board and courts drawing the line between em-
ployees and small independent business men. Its particular target
was NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,9 2 in which "newsboys,"
who sold their papers at fixed spots and were mature men support-
ing themselves and their families with the proceeds, were held to
be "employees" within the Act, even though their income depended
on the difference between their cost and sales price. In sustaining
this conclusion of the Board, the Supreme Court refused to con-
sider the distinction between employees and independent contractors
as one to be decided solely on the basis of criteria and "traditional
legal distinctions" developed in private law controversies without
90. Briggs Mfg. Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 65, 21 LRRM 1056, 1057.
91. Section 2(3). The problems raised by this amendment are analyzed
in Cox, supra note 3 at 5-8.
92. (1944) 322 U. S. 111.
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regard to the purposes of the Act.93 It stressed, as relevant to the
decision, that the particular workers "are subject, as a matter of
economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate
and that the remedies it affords are appropriate for preventing
them. . .. ,,94 These evils it itemized as (1) interruption of com-
merce through labor disputes between some "who, for other pur-
poses are technically 'independent contractors' and their employers,"
(2) inequality of bargaining power, and (3) dependence on a daily
wage. It pointed out that for each of these evils collective bargain-
ing was an appropriate and effective method of settlement. 0 On
that foundation the Court set out its criterion for distinguishing
between an employee and independent contractor for the purposes
of the NLRA:
"In short, when the particular situation of employment com-
bines these characteristics, so that the economic facts of the rela-
tion make it more nearly one of employment than of independent
business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accom-
plished by the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh
technical legal classification for purposes unrelated to the statute's
objectives and bring the relation within its protection."0' 6
The specific exclusion of independent contractors came into the
amended Act as a direct response to this decision. Both the House
Committee in reporting out the bill for passage with this change in
it,9r and the Conference Committee, in approving the change,08 re-
ferred by name to the Hearst case as demonstrating the viewpoint
the amendment was designed "to correct."0'0 Stating that Congress
intended its words to be given their "ordinary meanings," the
House Report emphasized that "in the law there always has been
a difference" between employees and independent contractors. This
difference it stated as follows:
"'Employees' work for wages and salaries under direct super-
vision. 'Independent contractors' undertake to do a job for a price,
decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the
work, and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the
difference between what they pay for goods, materials and labor
and what they eceive for the end result, that is, upon profits.' 0 0
This quotation has been accepted by the Board as a statement of the
criteria which must govern its future decisions.' 0'
93. Id. at 126-29.
94. Id. at 127.
95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 128 (italics added).
97. House Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 18 (1947).
98. House Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 32 (1947).
99. House Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 18 (1947).
100. Ibid.
[o.32:663
"NTEW" LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The first case to raise the effect of the amendment held that cer-
tain "newsboys" of the Kansas City Star were independent con-
tractors.""'- The relationship between these newsboys and the paper
was such that, consistent with the Hearst case, they might well
have been held independent contractors on the authority of a pre-
vious Board decision.1' 3 There the Board had followed the basic
reasoning of the Hearst opinion but found that the "economic
facts" in the particular newsboy relationship made it "more nearly
one of independent enterprise than of employment in respect to
the ends to be accomplished by the Act."'10 4 The significance of the
Kansas City Star case lies in the fact that the Board, though recog-
nizing the similarity of the two cases, declined to place any reliance
on the earlier decision, departed completely from its earlier reason-
ing, and based the decision on the criteria set out in the House
Report quoted above. 1 5
The second case also gave independent contractor status to
"agents" who operated rural telephone exchanges for a large
company under contracts requiring them to keep the exchange open
24 hours each day, to make contracts for the company, and collect
the revenue for the account of the company.10 6 In both the Kansas
City Star and the telephone decision the following factors were
stressed in finding an independent contractor status: (1) In each
the contractor was free from control as to detailed manner in which
the business was conducted, and the contracts and collections made.
This freedom to decide "how the work will be done" was one of
the factors mentioned in the House Report. (2) In each the con-
tractor hired his own helpers and the company exercised no control
over this. This factor was emphasized as "most persuasive" in the
telephone case.0 7 (3) In each the contractor had discretion over
the salaries he would pay his helpers. (4) In each the contractor
was not required to devote his time exclusively to the job, and could
hire as much work done by others as he desired, thus increasing
or decreasing the amount of his profit. This was stressed as sig-
nificant in the telephone case,' 0s and is one of the factors mentioned
in the House Report. (5) In each the profit depended upon the
101. See Kansas City Star, (1948) 76 NLRB No. 52, 21 LRRM 1185,
1186.
102. Ibid.
103. Philadelphia Record Co., (1946) 69 NLRB 1232.
104. Id. at 1240.
105. See 21 LRRM% 1186.
106. Southwestern Associated Telephone Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 157,
21 LRRM 1298.
107. 21 LRRM 1300.
108. Id. at 1299
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difference between cost to the contractor and gross proceeds from
the undertaking. This, too, was stressed in the House Report.
Chairman Herzog dissented in the telephone case and empha-
sized several factors looking toward an employee relationship, which
were not present in the Kansas City Star case.1° 9 In such border-
line cases, where conflicting factors point in different directions,
complete agreement can hardly be expected. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that the approach of Chairman Herzog was substantially the
same as that of the majority, stressing those factors which would
be weighed in any private law controversy in distinguishing on
"general principles of law" between an agent and an independent
contractor. 110 Thus the primary significance of these decisions is
the complete abandonment by the Board of its previous reliance on
the "economic facts" in their relation to the purposes of the Act,
and its submission to the apparent intent of Congress that in dis-
tinguishing between "employees" and small business men the tradi-
tional legal distinctions shall control without regard for the ob-
jectives of the Act.
PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVE
One of the major changes with respect to representation pro-
ceedings was the withdrawal of Board jurisdiction to investigate
questions of representation raised by a labor organization not com-
plying with the reporting and non-communist affidavit require-
ments. The effect of this change has already been considered."'
Other amendments of significance relate to (1) determination of
the appropriate bargaining unit, (2) election procedure and re-
quirements, and (3) decertification proceedings. These will be
considered in that order.
Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Apart from specific changes with respect to professional em-
ployees, craft units, guards,"12 and the effect to be given "the extent
109. Id. at 1300-1301. The following factors were stressed: (1) The
equipment used belonged to the company, not the agent. (2) The revenue
collected was for the account of the company. (3) The company paid for
Social Security and Workmen's Compensation coverage for the agents and
their operators. (4) The contract could be terminated with or without
cause on one day's notice, which, coupled with the fact that the work of the
agent is part of the company's regular business, "reminds sharply of a master
and his servant."
110. Id. at 1300.
111. Pp. 666-73 supra.
112. Section 9 (b) (1), (2) and (3).
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to which employees have organized,"" 3 no basic changes were made.
in the provisions of the Act with respect to determining the appro-
priate bargaining unit. A minor verbal change was made in stating
the purpose of the Board's decision as to the unit appropriate for
collective bargaining, 114 but the change does not appear significant.
The Board has indicated that the amendments in the Act have not
changed its basic criterion for determining the appropriate unit.
This was affirmed when the Chrysler Corporation sought to estab-
lish separate units for different divisions of office employees, such
as the sales, accounting and manufacturing divisions. In approving
a plant-wide unit for office and clerical employees, the Board stated:
"The principal criterion used by the Board in grouping em-
ployees for bargaining purposes has been community of interest.
The Board has generally held that employees with similar interests
shall be placed in the same bargaining unit. The recent amendments
to the Act have not changed this rule of decision, except to em-
phasize the distinctivefiess of craft employees, professional em-
ployees, and guards.""'"
This affirmance that the basis for determining the appropriate
unit has not changed, except as expressly provided in the Act, is
underlined by decisions reasoning that inspectors" 6 and time-
keepers"71 may properly be included in the same unit with produc-
tion workers, because, unlike guards, Congress did not specify that
they must be in separate units. These particular decisions will be
further considered after the guard provision has been studied.
Professional Employees
Section 9 (b) (1) expressly requires a separate bargaining
unit for professional employees, unless a majority of the profes-
sional employees vote for inclusion in a unit also containing non-
professional employees. Apart from its initial decisions as to which
employees are "professional," the Board has no discretion to require
their inclusion in a wider unit. The definition of professional em-
113. Section 9 (c) (5).
114. In the original Act the purpose was "to insure to employees the
full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining
and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act." Section 9(b). In the
amended Act the purpose is "to assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act." The change would seem
appropriate in view of the greater freedom under the Act for professional
and craft employees to decide for or against a separate unit.
115. Chrysler Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 10. 21 LRRM 1163, 1164.
116. Clayton 'Mark & Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 33, 21 LRRM 1174.
117. Art Metal Construction Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 11, 20 LRRMf
1331.
1948]
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ployees is quite exacting,"' and thus far the reported Board deci-
sions have held only attorneys"' and time-study employees120 to
be professionals. Newspaper editors and reporters,' 21 chemical
laboratory employees who perform routine chemical analysis, 122
diesel engine mechanics, 12' and a building construction company's
surveying party, its construction inspectors and its mechanical
engineers with primarily inspection duties 24 have been ruled non-
professional.
All four opinions which classify the employees as non-profes-
sional stressed the "routine" character of their work. In ruling that
the city editor, night editor, sports editor and out-of-town reporters
on a daily newspaper were not professional employees, the Board
noted that "although judgment and discretion are involved to a
greater or lesser degree... much of the. . news coverage consists
of routine news items, and, in other stories, the individual reporter
governs himself according to the known policies of the Employ-
er."' 5 This might seem to intimate that if a substantial part of the
work is routine, and the rest involves a degree of judgment and
discretion but is controlled by "known policies of the Employer,"
it does not meet the statutory requirement of "consistent exercise
of discretion and judgment." 1 6 Yet trial attorneys for an insurance
118. Section 2 (12). "The term 'professional employee' means-
"(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or
physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judg-
ment in its performance; (iii) of such character that the output produced or
the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period
of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science
or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intel-
lectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital,
as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship
or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes; or
"(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized
intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a),
and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional
person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined
in paragraph (a)."
119. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. of Chicago, (1948) 75 NLRB
No. 129, 21 LRRM 1107.
120. Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 80,
21 LRRM 1066.
121. Jersey Publishing Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 70, 21 LRRM 1196.
122. 'Wasatch Oil Refining Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 58, 21 LRRM
1203.
123. Ferguson-Steere M.otor Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 159, 21 LRRM
1286.
124. Starrett Bros. & Eken, Inc., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 37, 22 LRRM
1003.
125. Jersey Publishing Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 70, 21 LRRM 1196,
1197.
126. See note 118 supra (italics added).
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company were held to be professional, even though their exercise
of discretion in preparation and trial of cases was governed by
policies set forth by the company, 27 and any lawyer knows that a
considerable amount of their work was fairly routine in nature.
Obviously, it will not ah;ays be easy to draw the line between
"routine mental . . . work" and work "predominantly intellectual
and varied in character" requiring "the consistent exercise of judg-
ment and discretion in its performance.' ' 28
Fortunately, that is not the sole criterion. There is more to the
professional status than that distinction. The statutory requisites
for professional employees are cumulative, 2 9 and the absence of
one professional requisite may influence a borderline decision on
another. Thus, the non-professional character of the newspaper
editors' required training may well have influenced the Board's
remarks on the non-professional character of their work. At any
rate, a second reason given for the newspaper decision was that
"none of the employees in the editorial department are required to
have a license or to undergo special training in a school of higher
learning. A few are graduates of schools of journalism or academic
colleges."'1 0 The latest case, holding the surveying party and
mechanical engineers in building construction non-professional, like-
wise noted that the employees were not required to have a pro-
fessional engineering degree or its equivalent, though such a degree
helped in securing employment.' 31 Thus the Board recognized and
stressed the very special type of knowledge required to qualify as
a professional employee-that "customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized ... study in an institution of higher learning
or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic educa-
tion."132
It seems apparent that, apart from the statutory definition, the
traditional concept of a "profession" will have some bearing on the
127. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. of Chicago, supra note 119.
128. See statutory definition, supra note 118.
129. Ibid. Contrast the functions of supervisors which are stated in the
alternative. See p. 678 supra.
130. Jersey Publishing Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 70, 21 LRRM. 1196,
1197. The Board also mentioned that "the most highly regarded employees
are those who have had considerable practical experience in newspaper
work."
131. Starrett Bros. & Eken, Inc., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 37, 22 LRRM
1003, 1004-5.
132. See statutory definition, supra note 118. Cf. Charles Eneu John-
son & Co., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 3, 21 LRRAI 1325, holding that a "pro-
fessional chemist" who performed electrical maintenance work was not a
professional employee. Clearly, it is the character of the work and the
knowledge required to perform it, which controls.
194S]
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decisions in close cases. For example, the reference to no necessity
for licenses in the newspaper case has no basis in the definition, but
licenses are one of the indicia of some of the professions. Several of
the traditional professions are enumerated in the Congressional
reports as among those for whose berlefit this provision was in-
serted,13  and these reports have been given controlling weight by
the Board. Indeed, they seem to have been the sole reason given for
the decision in the attorney case, 134 and in the newspaper case the
Board mentioned the absence of any indication in the legislative
history that reporters or editors were intended to be included
among the professions.'-'
In one instance the Board appears to have given unjustifiable
weight to a remark in the Conference Committee Report with ref er-
ence to time-study employees. It ruled that such employees, whose
function -was to determine the factual basis for the operation of
the employer's incentive wage plan, were professional employees
rather than supervisors. 136 Its reliance on the legislative history to
rule that such employees are not supervisors appears entirely sound,
but the Board's further conclusion that the "Conference Report in-
dicates that, at the very least, time-study employees may be re-
garded as professional employees" appears unfounded.13, After ex-
plaining that the conference agreement did not treat time-study
employees as supervisors, as had the House bill, the Conference
Report merely stated:
"Since, however, time-study employees may qualify as profes-
sional personnel, the special provisions of the Senate amendment
. ..applicable with respect to professional employees will cover
many in this category."' 3
While it .is evident from this sentence that the members of the
Committee believed "many" time-study employees would qualify
as professional employees, there is no indication that they believed
133. The Conference Committee Report says the "definition in general
covers such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel
together with their junior professional assistants." See House Report No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess: p. 36 (1947). The Senate Labor Committee Report
states the provision is intended to recognize the special problems of "many
professional persons, including architects, engineers, scientists, lawyers, and
nurses." See Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., tst Sess. p. 11 (1947).
134. See Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. of Chicago, (1948) 75
NI.RB No. 129, 21 LRRM%{ 1107, 1108-9.
135. See Jersey Publishing Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 70, 21 LRRM
.1196, 1197.
136. Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No.
80, 21 LRRM 1066.
137. Ibid. (italics added).
138. House Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 35 (1947) (italics
added).
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time-study personnel as a class should automatically be treated as
professional.
No reasoned application of the definition of professional em-
ployees to time-study employees was made in the foregoing case.
The Board did state that "time-study employees . . . by reason of
their training and responsibilities, are professional employees with-
in the meaning of Section 2 (12)," '1 3' but went on to rely on the
above legislative history to justify that conclusion without any
analysis of the actual duties and required training of the employees
as applied to the statutory definition. It should be noted, however,
that the professional status of the employees was not actually in
issue. The employer was defending a charge of refusal to bargain
with the time-study employees' certified union on the ground that
they were supervisors or management employees, and there was no
contested issue before the Board as to their right to a separate bar-
gaining unit. If such a problem should arise, the Board will doubt-
less give more searching consideration to the issue.
Craft Employees
Unlike the provision for professional employees, Section 9(b)
(2) does not require a separate unit for craft employees even
though the majority desire it. All it requires is that the Board shall
not decide that a craft unit is inappropriate "on the ground that a
different unit has been established by a prior Board determination,
unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote
against separate representation. ' 40 Literally, this merely provides
that if the reason for denying a separate craft unit is a prior Board
detcrmination in favor of a different unit, then the craft employees'
vote must be permitted to decide the matter.
Despite this literal meaning, during the first seven months under
the amended Act the craft proviso appeared to have the effect in
practice of permitting a separate bargaining unit whenever a ma-
jority of the craft members desired it. In a large number of cases
separate elections were ordered, some in industries which had a
history of plant-wide bargaining over periods up to ten years.' 4 1
Until March 23, 1948, seven months after the effective date, no
petition for an election to determine the craft employees' desires
139. 21 LRRM 1066.
140. Section 9 (b) (2) (italics added).
141. See, e.g., Continental Can Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 18, 21 LRRM
1159 (10 years); Harnischfeger Corp., (1947) 75 NLRIB No. 74, 21 LRRM
1064 (9 years) ; Westinghouse Electric Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No 73, 21
LRRM 1063 (7 years) ; Buckeye Steele Castings Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No.
117, 21 LRRMf 1099 (7 years).
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for a craft unit appears to have been turned down when a true
craft group was involved. Finally, a decision on March 23, and
another early in April, imposed important restrictions on the estab-
lishment of craft units.
In the first case1 42 the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers sought to carve out a separate craft unit for 200 electri-
cians from 8500 employees in a division-wide industrial unit in
the Baldwin Locomotive Works. The 200 were employed as pro-
duction electricians, construction electricians, maintenance electri-
cians, substation operators, and electronics technicians and instru-
ment assemblers. The electricians in each department worked with
the employees of that department, rather than with the other elec-
trical workers. Thus, the production electricians worked with other
production employees under the general direction of supervisors
exercising control over all operations in the integrated production
process. The Board ruled against a separate craft unit, stressing
three considerations: (1) This situation was unlike those in which
severance had been granted to a "homogeneous" craft unit, where
there was "little or no commingling with other crafts engaged in an
integrated production process."' 4 3 (2) The major portion of the
proposed unit had no special community of interest any greater
than their community of interest with other employees.1 44 (3) Sec-
tion 9(b) (2) does not compel the granting of the petition, as
claimed by petitioner, "inasmuch as we are not basing our con-
clusion on any prior determination.' ' 4
5
In the second case 46 the Bricklayers Union contended that the
Board had no discretion to refuse to carve out a craft unit for
-bricklayers in the National Tube Company's basic steel plant. In
rejecting this contention the Board reasoned as follows :. 4 7 (1)
"The only restriction imposed by Section 9(b) (2) is that a prior
board determination cannot be the basis for denying separate
representation to a craft group." The statutory language is not
ambiguous, and the inconclusive legislative history does not justify
a decision that Congress also intended to exclude use of the bargain-
ing history of a particular employer as a controlling factor. (2)
142. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (1948) 76 NLRB No. 124, 21 LRRMN
1263.
143. 21 LRR2f 1264.
144. "The production electricians appear to have no greater com-
munity of interest with the construction electricians, for example, than they
have with any non-electrical craft in the plant." Ibid.
145. Ibid.
146. National Tube Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 169, 21 LRRM 1292.
147. See 21 LRRM 1293-4 (italics added).
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Even assuming Congressional intent to exclude such bargaining
history as a controlling factor, the only .restriction is that "such
prior determination or bargaining history may not be the sole
ground" for denying a separate craft unit, but it may be used "as a
factor to be considered in determining the issue of craft severance."
(3) The "bargaining history in an industry may be considered as
a weighty factor" on the appropriateness of separate craft repre-
sentation, as there is no suggestion in the proviso or the legislative
history of any limitation on the use of this factor, regardless of a
possible limitation on the bargaining history of a particular em-
ploycr.145 (4) The Board can give such weight as it deems neces-
sary to the other factors on which it "has customarily based its de-
termination as to the appropriateness . . . of a proposed unit," in-
cluding "the basic nature of the duties performed by the craft
employees in relation to those of the production employees," and
"the integration of craft functions with the over-all production
processes of the employer."
Having thus disposed of the contention that it had no choice in
the matter, the Board proceeded to state two basic reasons for deny-
ing the bricklayers a separate unit: (1) The brickmakers were
integrated with the production employees in the steelmaking process
itself. (2) The steel industry generally had a long history of col-
lective bargaining upon the basis of an over-all unit in which craft
employees, including brickmakers, have been included.149 The latter
point was rather briefly stated, but the Board developed the inte-
gration factor at more length. It pointed out that, unlike the usual
craft maintenance employees whose work on any particular piece
of production equipment occurs at irregular intervals, the brick-
148. The Board pointed out that Section 9 (b) (2) was enacted by
"Congress with an eye directed toward" the American Can doctrine [Ameri-
can Can Co., (1939) 13 NLRB 1252], substantially modified later, which
had permitted the bargaining history of a particular employee to be a
sufficient basis for denying separate representation to a craft unit, but added
that the American Can rule "generally was not applied to questions of
separate craft representation where the controlling factor relied upon by
the Board was the bargaining history at the plant of the particular employer
concerned." 21 LRRM 1294.
149. See 21 LRRM 1295. These two basic reasons were summarized
in the concluding paragraph of the opinion: ". . . we are of the opinion
that the factors relied upon by the Board in Matter of Geneva Steel Com-
pany (67 NLRB 1159) particularly those of integration and bargaining his-
tory in the industry are equally present here. They continue to present a
compelling argument in favor of an over-all bargaining unit, and against
separate units of these particular craft employees in the basic steel industry."
Ibid. (italics added). On the same day an identical ruling was made in the
case of another employer on the authority of the National Tube case. Ameri-
can Rolling Mills Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 170, 21 LRRM 1295.
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layers were engaged in a "definite program of replacing and re-
pairing on regularly succeeding occasions, the instrumentalities
used in the continuous production of basic steel." They ha41 spe-
cialized skills with reference to construction and repair of equip-
ment peculiar to the steel industry. Thus the bricklayers' "functions
were intimately connected with the steelmaking process itself." They
and the steel production employees "enjoy similar working condi-
tions," and by a job evaluation program the "wage rates of all
production employees, including . .. bricklayers .. . have been
integrated into a single coordinated wage structure." The signifi-
cance of these integrated operations is summarized in the following:
"The Board is greatly impressed by the argument of the Em-
ployer that, due to the integrated nature of operations in the steel
industry, any change in the unit governing the bargaining relations
between the Employer and its employees would be detrimental to
the basic wage rate structure underlying the Employer's present
operations, and would necessarily have an adverse effect upon its
productive capacity in an industry of vital national concern."
Indeed, production could soon be stopped completely by the strike
of a separate craft unit performing essential functions in an inte-
grated production process.
It should not be concluded from these cases that the Board has
abandoned the liberal policy toward permitting separate craft units,
so evident during the first seven months of the amended Act. During
that period the Board gave no apparent weight either to prior
Board determinations or to the previous bargaining history of the
particular employer, and despite its reservation of the right to
give limited weight to those factors in the National Tube opinion,
there is little reason to expect a change in this policy. Indeed, in
the National Tube opinion the Board said that the decision should
not be taken to mean that the trend "in the direction of easing the
path of a union desiring severance of ;i craft unit" "is about to be
reversed."' 'iO On the other hand, these recent cases do indicate
that the Board feels under no compulsion to permit separate craft
units when factors other than individual bargaining history and
prior board determinations make such a unit inappropriate in its
judgment.
Briefly summarizing, the cases thus far indicate that the follow-
ing factors may incline the Board against a separate craft unit:
(1) An integrated production process with which the craft is in-
timately connected along with other production employees, as con-
trasted with a craft group engaged primarily in maintenance and
150. 21 LRRMf 1293.
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other auxiliary functions.' 1' (2) A community of interest, such as
similarity of working conditions and related wage patterns, between
craft employees and other employees, as contrasted with a some-
what segregated homogeneous unit among the craft employees.11
2
(3) A long history of collective bargaining within the industry upon
the basis of the overall unit in which craft employees are in-
cluded."5 3
Though the statute does not define "craft" the Board appears
to have had no trouble in applying the term. Illustrative of the
crafts which have been authorized to establish separate units under
the amended Act are pattern-makers, 54 pipe fitters and plumbers,' 55
machinists, 1 6 sheet metal workers, 5 7 steam engineers, 58 carpenters
and tinsmiths.'-" The Board has been rather strict in requiring that
a true craft be involved, but the problem has not been what con-
stitutes a craft, but rather whether the particular employees involved
meet the standards of one of the recognized crafts. For example,
employees engaged in painting new freight cars were held not to
constitute a craft, because they were recruited from the unskilled
labor force and "their skills are not comparable to those of journey-
men painters who require a considerable period of apprenticeship
before attaining the rank and status of craftsmen."'160 Similarly,
a separate unit for tool room employees was denied because only
two of the eight employees had prior experience as tool and die
makers. The Board reasoned that the predominance of inexperi-
enced workers and absence of a formal apprentice training program
151. In addition to the National Tube and Baldwin Locomotive Works
cases, this consideration was mentioned in Pacific Car and Foundry Co.,(1948) 76 NLRB No. 2, 21 LRRM 1161, and General Motor Corp., (1948)
76 NLRB No. 122, 21 LRRM 1253, in both of which the Board found that
true crafts were not involved.
152. In addition to the National Tube and Baldwin Locomotive Works
cases, this factor was mentioned in General Motor Corp, supra note 151.
153. Contrasted with the National Tube case, the converse of this
factor was mentioned in a number of cases authorizing separate craft units
for the reason, among others, that craft units were "frequently encountered"
in the industry. See, e.g., Continental Can Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 18, 21
LRRM 1159; Firestone Fire and Rubber Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 32, 21
LRRM 1167; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 73, 21 LRRM
1063.
154. Westinghouse Electric Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 73, 21 LRRM
1063.
155. General Motors Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 122 ,21 LRRM 1253.
156. Continental Can Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 18, 21 LRRM 1159.
157. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 32, 21
LRRM 1167.
158. Allied Mills, (1948) 76 NLRB No. 138, 21 LRRM 1266.
159. Gulf Oil Corp., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 42, 22 LRRM 1009.
160. Pacific Car and Foundry Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 2, 21 LRRM
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disproved petitioner's assertion that this was a highly skilled craft
group.' -1 In another case, the employees in a forge, annealing and
heat-treatment department of a ball bearing plant were held not
to constitute a true craft, because none of the employees performed
all of the functions attributable to the blacksmith's craft.10 2
The Board has likewise been careful to require that the pro-
posed separate unit be exclusively a craft group. Thus, it denied a
petition for a separate unit when only 80 of the 325 foundry em-
ployees in the proposed unit were coremakers and molders. 0 3 In
another case it denied the petition when it appeared that the em-
ployees in the proposed unit ranged from turbine engineers, elec-
trical engineers and machinists to floormen and the ash gang.
16
'
The emphasis in the latter opinion on the absence of any "special
community of interest," and the "heterogeneous skills and func-
tions," would seem to indicate that, even with the floormen and
ash gang removed, a true craft group would still not arise out of
three quite distinct crafts. This seems borne out by a decision in a
converse situation in which the Board refused to merge two separate
craft units of toolroom employees and maintenance electricians.
The Board reasoned that while each craft could constitute a sepa-
rate unit, they could not be united into one unless "the type of
work performed and the actual working conditions ...are suffi-
ciently integrated to indicate a substantial mutuality of interests
separate and apart from those of the other production and mainte-
nance employees.'165
Plant Guards
Unlike the provisos with respect to professional and craft em-
ployees, aimed at protecting such employees' interest in greater
self-determination as to their bargaining unit, Section 9 (b) (3)
is aimed at protecting the enployer's interest in the undivided
loyalty of his plant guards entrusted with enforcing rules against
other employees. Hence, the guard proviso is more drastic than the
others in two respects: (1) A bargaining unit cannot under any
circumstances include both guards and other employees. Thus, no
self-determination by the guards to bargain in the same unit with
161. Norge Division, Borg Warner Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 136,
21 LRRM 1271; cf. Combustion Engineering Co., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 11,
21 LRRM 1333.
162. General Motors Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 122, 21 LRRM 1253.
163. Link-Belt Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 59, 21 LRRM 1201.
164. Scovill Mfg. Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 153, 21 LRRM 1143.
165. Purolator Products, Inc., (NLRB 1948) 21 LRRMI 1208. This case
arose on a request of the employer to merge the two craft units which had
elected the same bargaining representative at consent elections.
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other employees is permitted. (2) No labor organization can be
certified to represent guards if it admits employees other than
guards to membership, or is affiliated with an organization which
does so. 6
Thus far the Board appears to have had no difficulty in deciding
when an employee is "employed as a guard to enforce against em-
ployees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer
or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises."'1 67
Watchmen,'6  gatemen of various kinds,"60 and deck patrols .70 on
a ship have been classified as guards, but firemen and fire inspec-
tors17' have been excluded when their duties did not meet the statu-
tory requirements. A recent decision ruled that in the absence of
evidence as to the duties of "watchmen" the Board would "assume
that they perform the normal duties of such employment, and,
therefore, enforce against employees and other persons rules to
protect the property of the Employer .... ,,.2
It might be noted that in the proviso the definition of guard
appears only in the first clause relating to the bargaining unit, but
it has been applied as well to the second clause requiring that the
certified union shall not admit other employees to membership.173
Obviously this was intended, as the restriction on union member-
ship applies only to a union certified as the representative for "a
bargaining unit of guards.'. 74
166. The proviso reads as follows: "Provided, That the Board shall not
* .. (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes,
together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce
against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the em-
ployer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but
no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in
a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is
affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to member-
ship, employees other than guards." Section 9(b) (3). The proviso was a
compromise. The House bill had excluded guards from the Act altogether,
classifying them with supervisors. The Conference Committee chose in this
manner to give them the benefit of the Act, but separate them entirely from
other employees in their union relationship so as to eliminate any danger
of collusion or conflicting loyalties arising out of such relationships.
167. See note 166 supra.
168. See, e.g., Macungie Silk Co., (1948) 75 NI.RB No. 88, 21 LRRM
1077; C. V. Hill & Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 24,21 LRRM.f 1172.
169. See, e.g., ibid.; Young Patrol Service, (1947) 75 NLRB No. 51, 21
LRRM 1046 (included gatemen, gangplank men, hatch watchmen, ship deck
patrols, and employees who watch cargo on the docks).
170. Ibid.
171. Monsanto Chemical Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 109, 21 LRRM
1239.
172. American Zinc Co. of Ill., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 7, 21 LRRM 1327.
173. Young Patrol Service, (1947) 75 NLRB No. 51, 21 LRRM 1046.
174 See note 166 supra.
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The classification of part-time watchmen is the only controver-
sial issue to arise thus far under this section. In a 3 to 2 division the
Board ruled that employees who spend less than 50% of their time
on guard duties will be placed in a bargaining unit with other em-
ployees. In companion cases, this 50% rule was applied to exclude
from the guard proviso (1) janitors who devoted full time to guard
duties as watchmen one week out of four, 75 and (2) employees
who regularly combined maintenance duties with duties as night
watchmen, if the latter duties required less than 50% of their
working time.1 -7 The majority reasoned that Section 9(b) (3)
did not require the Board to classify as a guard every employee
devoting "any part of his working time, however insignificant" to
guard duties. Rather, an individual should be considered employed
as a guard only if his guard duties "constitute a dominant aspect,
and not merely an incidental feature of his total work pattern.' 7 7
The dissenting members of the Boara contended that there was no
statutory authority for excluding part-time guards from Section
9(b) (3), and that to do so ignored the Congressional purpose to
eliminate the possible "conflict between his loyalty to fellow union
members and to his employer" for that period during which guard
duties were performed. 7
Though it would seem reasonable to exclude insignificant or
trivial guard duties as establishing a guard status, it may well be
questioned whether an arbitrary 50% dividing line achieves the
Congressional purpose. Particularly in the small establishment
where it is not economically feasible to employ full-time watchmen,
and janitors and other maintenance men are entrusted with sub-
sidiary duties as guards to prevent unauthorized entry by employees
and others, this 50% rule would deprive the employer of the protec-
tion Congress intended to provide. However, any change in this
rule would seem now to depend upon judicial or legislative action,
for, having voiced their disagreement, the dissenting members an-
nounced they would follow the majority rule thereafter ;17' and one
of the dissenting members later participated in a panel which ruled
unanimously that,employees devoting one-third of their time to
175. Radio Corp.. of Am., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 115, 21 LRRAI 1250.
176. Steelweld Equipment Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 116, 21 LRRM
1252. The record as to time devoted to guard duties was not clear. The Board
ruled that if they spend more than 50% of their time as watchmen they
would be considered guards; otherwise, not.
177. Radio Corp. of Am., supra note 175, 21 LRRM 1250-51.
178. Id. at 1251. Reynolds and Murdock dissented.
179. Steelweld Equipment Co., supra note 176, 21 LRRM at 1252.
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guard duties could be included in a bargaining unit with other em-
ployees. 80
The Board has ruled on two occasions that the guard proviso
is mandatory and cannot be waived by agreement of the parties, in-
cluding the employer.'' Certainly no opening is left for such
waiver in the terms of the Act which expressly forbid the Board
to find any unit appropriate if it contains both guards and other
employees. Even though the proviso seems designed primarily to
protect the employer, it may well have been intended by Congress
to free him from concerted pressure to waive his right to insist on
a separate unit and separate union for his guards.
Complete independence of any union representing a bargaining
unit of guards seems assured by a recent Board ruling that a
federal labor union, created and chartered by AFL for the sole pur-
pose of representing plant guards, did not meet the requirements
of Section 9 (b) (3) forbidding affiliation "directly or indirectly"
with a labor organization admitting other employees to member-
ship.Y81a The Board reasoned that through the medium of the
federation, the guard union was indirectly affiliated with the
national and international labor organizations constituting the AFL.
The guard proviso has a broader sweep than merely limiting
future establishment of bargaining units and future certification of
bargaining representatives. Two Circuit Courts of Appeal have held
that the proviso prevents future enforcement of Board orders, en-
tered prior to the effective date, requiring employers to bargain
with certified representatives of guards no longer eligible for cer-
tification because their membership was not limited to guards. -82
The courts reasoned that it would be contrary to the policy of
Congress embodied in Section 9(b) (3) to require bargaining with
such unions as representatives of guards. 8 3 While less articulate,
180. General Electric Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 142, 21 LRtM 1279(Reynolds a member of panel) ; cf. Clarkton Gramwood Products Co., (1948)
76 NLRB No. 151, 21 LRRAI 1279 (Murdock a member of panel holding
boiler tenders who devoted 20 minutes daily to guard duties not "guards"
within meaning of Act).
181. C. V. Hill & Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 24, 21 LRRM 1172;
American Zinc Co. of Ill., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 7, 21 LRRM 1327.
181a. Schenley Distilleries, Inc., Old Quaker Division, (May 5, 1948)
77 NLRB No. 80, 22 LRRIMf 1040.
182. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., (C.C.A. 6th 1947) 21
LRRM 2145; NLRB v. Atkins & Co., (C.C.A. 7th 1947) 165 F. 2d 659. In
the latter case, the Supreme Court had ruled, prior to the enactment of
LRRM, that the Circuit Courts should order enforcement of the Board
order. NLRB v. Atkins and Co., (1947) 331 U. S. 398.
183. See NLRB v. Atkins and Co., supra note 182, at 660; cf. NLRB v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 182, 21 LRRM at 2145-46.
19481
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
this reasoning was parallel to that on which the Board and courts
have ruled that a union not eligible for certification, because of non-
compliance with the reporting and affidavit requirements, is also
barred from an order compelling collective bargaining.18 4 The Board
has agreed with this position of the Courts in the guard cases. 85
Hence, pre-amendment certification of a bargaining representative
for guards cannot be expected to result in an obligation to bargain
in the future, unless the unit and the union meet the requirements
of Section 9(b) (3).
On the other hand, the pre-amendment certification of a bar-
gaining representative for guards has been held not to prevent the
subsequent certification of the same union as the representative of
other employees. 86 The Board reasoned that Section 9(b) (3)
only precludes certification of a union as a representative of guards
if it admits other employees to membership, but does not bar the
converse. This result seems reasonable when it is realized that the
opposite ruling would preclude many unions, such as the Interna-
tional Chemical Workers' Union here involved, from performing
their principal function of organizing and representing the rank and
file employees because they happened previously to have been cer-
tified as a representative of guards. Furthermore, to have required
the union to withdraw as representative of the guards before per-
mitting it to represent other employees would have jeopardized
the contracts already entered into on behalf of the guards. When
those contracts expire the employer could refuse to bargain with
the union as representative of the guards, and the rulings set out
in the preceding paragraph indicate that he would not be required to
bargain with a union now representing other employees. Bearing
indirectly on this, the Board did point out that "quite a different
question" would arise if the union had been seeking a "new cer-
tification for a guard unit."
Inspectors, Time-study Employees, and Timekeepers
It has been urged that separate units and unions should be re-
quired for inspectors, the same as for guards, even though Congress
only required it for the latter. In a case in which the inspectors
worked as a separate department, with authority to require machines
to be shut down for defective work, the Board ruled by a majority
of three that the inspectors were properly included in the same bar-
gaining unit with the production employees whose work they in-
184. See pp. 673-75 supra..
185. See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., supra note 182, 21
LRRA at 2146 (Board concedes the point in court).
186. E. R. Squibb & Sons, (1948) 77 NLRB No. 14, 21 LRRM 1336.
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spected. 87 Two of the majority reasoned that Congress was familiar
with previous Board decisions 89 placing inspectors in production
units, had given consideration to the matter, and had made no
special provision for inspectors as it had for guards.18 9 Therefore,
these two would make no change in the previous Board policy.
Chairman Herzog agreed with the result because the employer had
not sought a separate unit for inspectors but had sought their com-
plete exclusion from any unit. He was of the opinion, however, that
"strong arguments frequently prevail for establishing a separate
unit of inspectors" when one of the parties seek it, pointing out that
such separate units were established in 1944.190 He urged two
reasons for separate units: (1) "Inspectors' own interests are often
sharply divergent from those of ordinary production employees,"
a consideration relevant to the usual Board criterion of a com-
munity of interest between employees in the same unit. (2) Em-
ployers may believe that "such segregation will help to encourage
the loyalty of their inspectors."'19 Members Reynolds and Gray,
dissenting, would not Only have established a separate unit for the
reasons enumerated above, but would have ruled, also, that the
inspectors could not be represented by the same union as the rank
and file employees because of the conflict in loyalties which would
arise. 9 2
So long as the viewpoint of the present members of the Board
remains the same, it would seem that a majority of three could be
marshalled in favor of a separate unit for inspectors when re-
quested,9 3 but not for a separate union. The former can be re-
quired under the Board's discretionary power to decide the unit
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes, which certainly per-
187. Clayton Mark & Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 33, 21 LRRM 1174.
Attention has already been directed to the ruling in this case that inspectors
are not automatically classed as supervisors. See p. 679 supra.
188. Special attention was called to Luminous Processes, Inc., (1946)
71 NLRB 405, decided eight months prior to the enactment of LRMA, in
which the same decision was made over a dissent raising the same issues.
189. See Clayton Mark & Co., supra note 187, 21 LRRM at 1175. It was
pointed out that the House bill had excluded inspectors as supervisors, but
in reversing this decision the Conference Committee gave no indication that
inspectors were to be placed in a separate unit as it had contemplated with
respect to the companion problem of time-study employees who "might
be regarded as professional employees." Ibid.
190. See, e.g., Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., (1944) 55 NLRB
577; Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., (1944) 58 NLRB 1009. In both
cases it was ruled that inspectors should be in a unit separate from produc-
tion and maintenance employees, emphasizing the lack of similarity of
interests.
191. See Clayton Mark & Co., supra note 187, 21 LRRM at 1175.
192. Id. at 1176.
193. Chairman Herzog, Reynolds and Gray.
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mits consideration of such elements as lack of community of interest
between inspectors and production employees, and the conflict of
loyalties which would arise in case all belonged to the same bar-
gaining unit. But to take the further step advocated by the two
dissenting members, and require a separate union, would appear
to have no statutory basis and to be contrary to Section 9(a), which
provides that the representative selected by a majority of employees
in the appropriate unit "shall be the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative." There is no Board authority to rule that such a repre-
sentative is inappropriate, except in the case of guards.
The same problem was temporarily avoided in the case of time-
study employees by classifying them as professional, 104 and even this
was not 'in issue since they already constituted a separate unit with
an independent union. In that case, however, Mr. Reynolds served
notice that he concurred only because the certified union was inde-
pendent from any labor organization representing rank and file
employees, and took the position that its certification should be con-
tinued only so long as it maintained that independent character. 10
The doubtful classification of all time-study employees as "profes-
sional," previously considered, 196 does not really solve the problem,
since professional employees have the option of voting for inclusion
with other employees. If that shoujd occur, the same problem as
that involved in the inspector case will be presented, and would
seem to depend upon the same basic considerations.
In an earlier decision a similar issue was raised with respect to
timekeepers, when it was ruled that they could be included in an
existing maintenance and production unit.' 97 The Board rejected
arguments pointing to the absence of a community of interest and
the dangers of possible conflicts of interest or collusion. To the
latter it gave the blunt answer that discharge was the remedy for
collusion or neglect of duty, and added that had Congress intended
to apply to timekeepers the same principle it had applied to guards
"it would have said so."19 8
The community of interest argument would seem of much great-
er weight for setting technically qualified inspectors and time-study
employees, as distinct from ordinary timekeepers, apart from the
run-of-the-mill production workers. On the other hand, the -con-
194. Worthington Pump & Machinery Corp., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 80,
21 LRRM 1066, considered p. 690 supra.
195. Id. at 1067.
196. See pp. 690-91 supra.
197. Art Metal Construction Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 11, 20 LRRM
1331.
198. Ibid.
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sideration based on possible collusion and conflict of interests would
seem more nearly of equal weight in all three situations, unless it
be thought there is greater danger of abuse in favor of fellow union
members in positions involving discretion and judgment than in
purely clerical operations such as timekeeping. The ultimate posi-
tion of the Board on all three situations must await further clarifi-
cation.
Extent to Which Employees are Organized as a Factor
Section 9(c) (5) provides that "the extent to which the em-
ployees are organized shall not be controlling" in determining the
appropriate unit. This amendment came at a time when the Board
had just reaffirmed its position that the extent of organization was
a significant factor but never the sole consideration." 9' The Board
explained that this policy often made collective bargaining for the
smaller unit "a reasonably early possibility," while prolonged delay
to perfect wider organization might tempt the organized employees
to strike for recognition or permit the unorganized employees to
thwart collective bargaining by those who desired it. But the Board
also made clear that the extent of organization was "never ... the
sole criterion, nor ... often the controlling one" and the coexistence
of two other facts was always required: (1) Bargaining on a more
comprehensive basis must be improbable in the near future, and (2)
the "unit sought must itself be homogeneous, identifiable and dis-
tinct" with work physically separated or functionally coherent and
differentiated from that of other employees.
20
The terms of the amended Act are reconcilable with this posi-
tion of the Board restated three days before its enactment, since
the Act merely provides that the extent of organization shall not be
"controlling." Still, the amendment indicates that Congress intended
to bring about a change in policy without completely eliminating ex-
tent of organization as a factor. The limited evidence thus far points
not only to greatly decreased emphasis on extent of organization by
the Board, but even to the possibility that it has been completely
199. Garden State Hosiery Co., (June 20, 1947) 74 NLRB 318, 20
LRRM 1149. The LRMA was enacted three days later, on June 23, 1947.
This position of the Board was repeated in its annual report for the year
ending June 30, 1947. See 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRR'M) 183, 185.
200. See 74 NLRB 321-22. Compare similar statement made the same
day in Hudson Hosiery Co., (1947) 74.NLRB 250, 252: "Extent of organiza-
tion can be most important but it can never be controlling in the full sense
of that term. It must also appear that the unit sought is composed of a
well-deliniated and functionally coherent group of employees, and that it has
some objective support over and above the petitioning union's momentary
preference."
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eliminated as a potent factor, though verbally retained as a possible
make-weight in a close case. No such close case has yet arisen.
In the three cases in which the Board has considered the extent
of organization since the Act became effective, it has refused to ap-
prove the requested unit on the ground that the only basis for doing
so would be the extent of organization, and the Act prohibits making
that factor controlling. - 1 In each opinion it stated that the extent
of organization is still one of the "factors to be weighed" though
never the sole or controlling "justification" for the unit, but in no
decision since the effective date of the Act does this factor appear
to have been given any consideration in determining an appropriate
unit. This negative record seems significant in view of the frequency
with which the extent of organization was given weight prior to
the amendment. Complete absence of any reliance on that factor
in the first eight months of the amended Act, as compared with at
least twelve cases in which it was made a potent factor in the pre-
ceding eight months, 202 would seem to indicate a basic change in
policy resulting from Section 9 (c) (5). It cannot be said with
assurance that without the amendment different results would have
been reached in the first two cases, for the required element of
homogeneity was lacking,0- 3 but in the last case a different decision
201. Delaware Knitting Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 27, 21 LRRM 1025;
Pomeroy's, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 96, 21 LRRM 1224; Mandel Bros.,
Inc., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 88, 22 LRRM 1046. Cf. Carson Pirie
Scott & Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 148, 21 LRRM 1130 (pre-amendment
Board determination based on extent of organization reversed because of
unduly artificial and impractical grouping, inappropriate even under pre-
amendment standards; "impact" of the amended Act not considered).
202. Engineering and Research Corp., (1947) 72 NLRB 1471; Mandel
Bros., Inc., (1947) 72 NLRB 859; Puritan Knitting Mills, (1947) 72 NLRB
1337; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., (1947) 73 NLRB 123; J. B. Cook Auto
Machine Co., (1947) 73 NLRB 249; Garden State Hosiery Co., (1947) 74
NLRB 318; Chadbourne Hosiery Mills, Inc., (1947) 74 NLRB 333: Nebel
Knitting Co., (1947) 74 NLRB 310; Waldensian Hosiery Mills, (1947) 74
NLRB 315; Asheboro Hosiery Mills, Inc., (1947) 74 NLRB 341; Jacoby-
Bender, Inc., (1947) 74 NLRB 337; Federated Publications, (1947) 74
NLRB 1054. This was not exceptional, but rather the rule for the preceding
periods as well. See e.g., LRRM Cumulative Digest and Index, Supplement
covering Volumes 16-19, Paragraphs 63.66 to 63.67 (1947).
203. See Delaware Knitting Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 27, 21 LRRM
1025; Pomeroy's, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 96, 21 LRRM 1224, 1225. Unlike
the Garden State Hosiery case (supra note 199) where the knitters and their
helpers were found to be an homogeneous group, because all were highly
skilled, closely integrated and physically separated from the rest of the work-
ers, the unit rejected in the Delaware Knitting Co. case consisted of a
variety of non-knitting personnel, with sharp distinctions in their function,
great variance in their required skill and training, and no apparent physical
separation from the rest of the workers. In Pomeroy's case the unit rejected
consisted of furniture salesmen in a department store whose basis of com-
pensation, working conditions and benefits were the same as all other em-
ployees, and who were required to have no special skill, knowledge or ex-
perience which would set them off from the other employees.
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as a result of the amendment is clearly indicated. That case in-
volved one of the pre-amendment bargaining units approved in
1947 because of the extent of organization, and the Board refused
to order collective bargaining with the certified union because the
amended Act now precluded it from finding the unit appropriate.
20 3a
Election of Bargaining Representative-Effect of Amendments
Secret Ballot
The original Act provided that the Board may "take a secret
ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method" to ascer-
tain the collective bargaining representative desired by the majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit.2 0 4 Thus union membership
cards, statements signed by a majority of the employees, and other
similar methods were once used for this purpose,20 5 although the
Board's policy later changed to require elections except when the
parties consented to the certification or to a card check as a sub-
stitute for an election.200 The amended Act leaves no choice in the
matter and specifies that if the Board finds a question of representa-
tion exists "it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certi-
fy the results. 2 0 7 The Board has ruled that this requires literal
compliance. Thus, even though three employees constituting the
entire unit expressed the desire to be represented by a particular
union, the Board refused to make an immediate certification and
ruled that the question of representation can be resolved only by
secret ballot2 0-
Twelve M'onths between Elections
Section 9(c) (3) precludes an election in any bargaining unit
in which "a valid election shall have been held" in the preceding
twelve month period. This has been held to apply to valid elections
held prior to the effective date of the amendment, 20 9 but the elec-
tion is not considered "valid" within the meaning of the statute if
it was not conclusive on the question of representation. Thus,
second elections have been ordered without waiting 12 months when
a clear majority was not obtained in the first election due to par-
203a. Mandel Bros., Inc., (May 10, 1948) 77 NLRB No. 88, 22 LRRM
1046. Earlier opinion cited supra note 202.
204. Section 9(c).
205. See NLRB, Third Annual Report (1939) 150-156.
206. See NLRB, Eleventh Annual Report (1946) 19 n. 3; cf. NLRB
Fifth Annual Report (1941) 60-61.
207. Section 9 (c) (1).
208. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 32, 21
LRRM 1167, 1168.
209. Lebrolite, Inc., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 68, 21 LRRM 1060.
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ticipation of ineligible voters2 10 and when the first election was
won prior to the effective date by a union which could not be cer-
tified because it failed to comply with the reporting and affidavit
requirements.2 11 It has also held that a card check, consented to by
the employer as a substitute for an election under the original Act,
is not a "valid election" within the meaning of this section.
212
In almost identical language Section 9(e) (3) provides that
no union shop election shall be held in any bargaining unit within
which a "valid election shall have been held" within the preceding
12 month period. The Board has ruled that such "valid election"
means a former union shop election, not an election on the issue
of bargaining representative.2 1 Apart from the complete separation
of the two sections, and the legislative history indicating that only
a second election on the issue of a union shop was contemplated
under Section 9(e) (3), the Board pointed out that to rule other-
wise would require a union which wins an election as bargaining
representative to wait twelve months before it could request an
election on the union shop issue. While the converse situation has
not arisen, it would seem likewise to follow that a union shop elec-
tion would not bar an election on the issue of representation for a
twelve month period, since Sections 9(c) (3) and 9(e) (3) are
held to be unrelated. On the other hand, a decertification election,
even though successful, will bar the election of another bargaining
representative for twelve months,?"a as both are elections within
the terms of Section 9 (c) (3).
Employer's Right to Petition for Election
An innovation in the amended Act is the right of an employer to
petition for an election pursuant to Section 9 (c) (1) (B) when
presented with a union claim for recognition. Many such elections
have been ordered, but on May 13, 1948, the Board dismissed such
a petition when at the hearing the union seeking recognition dis-
- avowed any claim to represent a majority of the employees. The
Board reasoned that a "question of representation" no longer
existed as required by the Act. It also urged the more potent policy
consideration that to order an election when the union no longer
210. Napa New York Warehouse, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 119, 21
LRRM 1251.
211. Nashville Corp., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 19, 21 LRRM 1334.
212. Arrow Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 32, 22
LRRI 1002.
213. Gilchrist Timber Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 177, 21 LRRM 1302.
213a. See Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., (Mfay 3, 1948) 77
NLRB No. 78, 22 LRRM 1034, considered infra p. 710.
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claimed to represent a majority "would deprive the employees of
any opportunity to select any bargaining representative for an
entire year after the election" in view of the provisions of Section
9 (c) ( 3 ).l1b
Right of Strikers to Vote
Under the original Act the Board's rule was that strikers were
entitled to vote at representation elections because they were still
employees 214 within the broad terms of Section 2(3) .215 After 1941
replacements for such strikers were also entitled to vote, 216 unless
hired after an unconditional offer by the strikers to return to
work,217 or unless the strike arose out of the employer's unfair
labor practice instead of an "economic" labor dispute.211 Even
though permitted to vote, economic strikers were entitled to rein-
statement only until permanent replacements -' ere hired for their
jobs.2 10 However, those who went out on strike because of an em-
ployer's unfair labor practice were entitled to reinstatement despite
attempted permanent replacements.
220
Into this setting Congress injected the following sentence in
Section 9(c) (3) : "Employees on strike who are not entitled to
reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote." The Board has made
no decision determining the eligibility of employees to reinstatement
within the meaning of that sentence, although it would seem that
the criteria outlined above would apply. However, the Board has
decided the impact of this provision on the procedure to be fol-
lowed when conducting an election during a strike. It followed
the same device used previously when the right of replacements
to vote depended upon undetermined facts. It ruled that all strikers
213b. Ny-Lint Tool & Mfg. Co., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 100, 22 LRRM
1061 (one member dissenting). Compare similar ruling dismissing decertifi-
cation petition. P. 710 infra.
214. Rudolph Ifrurlitzer Co., (1941) 32 NLRB 163, and cases cited in
notes 216 and 217.
215. "The term 'employee' shall include ... any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dis-
pute or because of any unfair labor practice ...." The amended Act is identical
in this respect.
216. Rudolph WVurlitzer Co., (1941) 32 NLRB 163; Columbia Pictures
Corp., (1945) 64 NLRB 490. The Wurlitzer case overruled A. Sartorius &
Co., (1938) 10 NLRB 493 in this respect, as the Sartorius case had ruled
that replacements were not eligible to vote.
217. Kellburn Mfg. Co., (1942) 45 NLRB 322.
218. Ibid.
219. NLRB v. Mackay Co., (1938) 304 U. S. 333.
220. Canvas Glove Mfg. Works, (1936) 1 NLRB 519; Ritzwoller Co.
v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th 1940) 114 F. 2d 432; NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon
Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1939) 105 F. 2d 167, cert. denied (1939) 308 U. S. 605.
These are only representative of many cases.
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and replacements shall be permitted to vote, subject to challenge.22'
The unchallenged ballots are then counted, and only if the chal-
lenged ballots will affect the results is it necessary to determine the
eligibility of the strikers and replacements. In so ruling, the Board
made clear that it was not prejudging the right of the striking
employees to reinstatement, or whether the new employees were
permanent replacements, but was merely using this procedure as
a device to determine the active employment status of strikers
and their replacements without unduly delaying the election. This
procedure has since been applied both to elections of bargaining
representatives22 2 and to decertification elections.223
Impact of "Free Speech" Guarantee on Representation Election
Section 8(c) o.f the amended Act provides that "expressing of
any views, argument or opinion... shall not constitute.., an un-
fair labor practice ... if such expression contains no threat of re-
prisal or force or promise of benefit." In a divided decision the Board
ruled that an employer's anti-union expression of opinion, which
fell short of an unfair labor practice because no threat or promise
could be found, nevertheless required an election, in which the
union lost, to be set aside because his conduct prevented a "free
and untrammeled choide.' '224 The employer had conducted an in-
tensive anti-union campaign in which the evils of unionism and the
beneficence of his company were emphasized in innumerable ways,
all falling short of the prohibited threat or promise. The particular
conduct which the Board held prevented a fair election consisted
of (1) bringing the employees into the employer's personal office
in some 25 groups of 20 to 25 individuals, and reading to each of
them in that "locus of final authority in the plant" an intemperate
anti-union address, and (2) sending his foremen to the homes of
his workers to propagandize against the union.22 5
In ruling that expressions of opinion which do not constitute an
unfair labor practice may still invalidate an election, the majority
pointed out that Congress limited the effect of Section 8(c) to un-
fair labor practices. It took the position that conduct which did not
violate the law so as to permit the imposition of a penalty, might
still, if extreme enough, fail to satisfy the "Board's own administra-
221. Pipe Machinery Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 37, 21 LRRM 1178.
The same device was used in the cases cited in notes 216, 217.
222. H. 0. Canfield Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 92, 21 LRRM 1217.
223. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 150, 21
LRRM 1281.
224. General Shoe Corp., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 18, 21 LRRM 1337.
225. 21 LRRM 1340.
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tive standards" for an election which would "determine the un-
inhibited desires of the employees."220 In support of this position,
it cited a Board decision under the Wagner Act which had set aside
an election because of union misconduct which impaired the em-
ployees' freedom of choice at a time when the union conduct was
not unlawful.22 7 The dissenting members, Reynolds and Gray, urged
that Congress intended the employer to be free to persuade his
employees not to join unions without restriction in time or place,
so long as he refrained from threats or promises, and pointed out
that the Board had theretofore consistently overruled objections
to elections predicated on anti-union utterances falling short of un-
fair labor practices.228 This prior practice is scarcely conclusive on
the issue, when it is borne in mind that, prior to the amendment,
conduct which was extreme enough to interfere with the free choice
of the employees could be found to be an unfair labor practice. 2 9
Apart from the problem of interpretation, this decision may
possibly place the Board in a difficult tactical position. It can set
aside an election for expression of opinion made in a manner or
under conditions which flagrantly interfere with the free choice of
the employees, but cannot enter an order preventing that conduct.
The employer is then free to repeat his successful tactics each time
an election is held, so long as he steers clear of the prohibited
threats or promises. If he successfully defeats the union, all the
Board can do is to set aside the election, wait until the effect of the
employer's campaign has subsided, and order a new election. In
this merry-go-round the employer will continue to come out on
top so long as he is able to persuade his employees to see things
his way. Actually, however, the Board's solution may be more
successful than this analysis suggests, for such employer tactics
would seem likely to lose their force with repetition, and the very
fact that the Board set aside the election for eniployer misconduct
might carry sufficient weight with the employees to offset the force
of the employer's persuasion.
Decertification Proceedings
An innovation under the amended Act is the provision for an
election to determine whether the representative previously-certified,
226. 21 LRRM 1341.
227. Continental Oil Co., (1944) 58 NLRB 169; cf. P. D. Gwaltney, Jr.
& Co., (1947) 74 NLRB 371 (conduct by third parties creating atmosphere of
intimidation and coercion interfering with free choice).
228. 21 LRRMI 1341, citing 1M. T. Stevens & Sons, (1946) 68 NLRB
229.
229. See NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., (1941) 314 U. S.
469, 477.
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or "currently recognized by the employer, ' 230 is still desired as the
bargaining representative by a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit.231 Before ordering a decertification election the
Board must find at a hearing that "such a question of representation
exists. 2 - 2 Before such a hearing will be ordered, the Board re-
quires a showing of 30% of the employees in support of the de-
certification petition.23 This preliminary showing is only an ad-
ministrative determination and the record at the hearing need not
show the petitioner's interest,2 4 nor reveal the names of the em-
ployees originally attached to the decertification petition.2 =
3
The certified union cannot prevent an election by showing that
a majority of the employees are its members when it is operating
under a union shop contract. 236 In so ruling the Board recognized
that a union with such a contract might have a majority of em-
ployees on its membership records and still be unequivocally re-
pudiated by them. It reasoned that Congress would not have in-
tended employees to jeopardize their jobs by withdrawing from the
union as a condition of filing a decertification petition.
A certified union can prevent a decertification election by
advising the Board that it no longer claims or wishes to represent
the employees. In such a case the Board cancelled the scheduled
election and dismissed the decertification petition over the em-
ployer's objections, one member dissenting. It reasoned that to
hold an election when the union no longer claims to represent the
employees would not only waste federal funds, but would mean
that the emplbyer could safely refuse'to bargain collectively with
any union for 12 months, since a decertification election would pre-
clude the election of another bargaining representative for 12
months under the provisions of Section 9 (c) (3) .230a By follow-
230. If the einployer has withdrawn recognition from an uncertified
union, a decertification petition will be dismissed since the statutory require-
ment that the union be certified or "currently recognized" is not met. Queen
City Warehouses, Inc., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 35, 22 LRRM 1012. If the
union demands recognition, the proper remedy in such a case is a petition
for investigation and certification of a bargaining representative.
231. Section 9(c) (1) (A) (ii).
232. Section 9(c) (1).
233.. NLRB-Procedures, § 202.17, (1947) 12 Fed. Reg. 2653-4, 20
LRRM 3111.
234. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 150, 21
LRRM 1281.
235. Free Press Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 152, 21 LRRM 1283.
236. Kraft Foods Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 77, 21 LRRM 1214.
236a. Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., (May 3, 1948) 77 NLRB
No. 78, 22 LRRM 1034; cf. A. Goodman & Son, (1948) 77 NLRB No. 40,
22 LRRM 1008 (no parties objected to dismissal).
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ing these tactics a union needing more time to build up a majority
can give up its present status as bargaining representative in ex-
change for a -later opportunity for an election after it has
strengthened its ranks.
As in the case of proceedings to elect bargaining representa-
tives, evidence of unfair labor practices is not admissible to defeat
a petition for decertification election. Thus, evidence that a petition
was instigated by the employer or brought about through his in-
timidation of employees was held properly excluded by the exam-
iner, and the Board ordered the election held.23 " The correct pro-
cedure in such a case is to file unfair labor practice charges against
the employer, in which case the election will be postponed if the
charges are sufficiently substantiated to justify issuance of a com-
plaint.238
In an analogous converse situation, the Board ruled in a 3 to
2 decision that a decertification petition could be withdrawn despite
the employer's assertion that the certified union coerced the peti-
tioner to request withdrawal.2 39 The Board relied upon its long
established practice permitting withdrawal of representation peti-
tions and upon the irrelevance of evidence of an employer's unfair
labor practice in both representation and decertification hearings.
It reasoned that the same principles should apply to withdrawal of
decertification petitions and to evidence of a union's unfair labor
practice. The Board indicated that if an unfair labor practice charge
were filed, a complaint issued and the hearings consolidated, the
ultimate disposition of the case might well be different. The dis-
senting members objected that this approach was unrealistic, since
237. Magnesium Casting Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 38, 21 LRRM 1179;
Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 57, 21 LRRM
1191.
238. See report of administrative rulings dismissing decertification peti-
tion where unfair labor practice charges were pending. 21 Lab. Rel. Rep.(LRRM) 266. Cf. NLRB v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., (C.C.A.
2d 1948) 167 F. 2d 470. In that case the court had previously entered an
order enforcing a board order requiring the employer to bargain with the
certified union. Soon thereafter a majority of the employees filed a petition
for decertification. The Board sustained the regional director's refusal to
proceed wit! the decertification petition on the ground that compliance with
the Board's order had not yet been effected. The Court refused to modify its
order, ruling that "it is for the Board to decide whether non-compliance is
a reason for refusing to consider the employee's petition." Id. at 2546. Cf.
Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, (1944) 321 U. S. 702, sustaining Board's de-
cision that employer must bargain with union which had majority when
refusal to bargain began, even though it no longer had a majority.
239. Underwriters Salvage Co. of N. Y., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 91, 21
LRRMXN 1210.
240. 21 LRRM 1211.
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coercion effective enough to cause withdrawal of the petition would
likewise prevent the filing of unfair labor practice charges. Still,
they apparently would not admit evidence of unfair labor practices
in the decertification hearing. Instead, they would adopt the blanket
position that once a decertification petition is supported by suffi-
cient evidence to meet the statutory requirements, "it should be
processed to ultimate solution of the question in the protected at-
mosphere of the ballot box" rather than to risk possible coercion
by permitting voluntary withdrawal. The majority simply could
not agree to create thus "an irrebuttable presumption that once a
petition for certification has been filed, subsequent efforts to with-
draw it are necessarily induced by coercion or other improper
means."
240
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND RELATED MATTERS
Employer's Unfair Labor Practices
Affiliated and Unaffiliated Unions
Probably the most revolutionary decision on unfair labor prac-
tices by employers arose out of the requirement in Section 10(c)
that in deciding cases under Section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2) the
"same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of
whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a
labor organization national or international in scope." Here Con-
gress was aiming at a long-established Board practice which treated
independent unions more severely than affiliated unions in case of
employer domination, support or interference in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a) (2).241 In such cases the Board invariably "disestab-
lished" the unaffiliated union and ordered the employer to withhold
recognition from it permanently 2 42 Such a disestablished union
could never be certified. On the other hand, the affiliated union was
never disestablished. Instead the Board only charged a violation of
Section 8(a) (1), rather than 8(a) (2), and ordered the employer
to cease the interference and to withhold recognition pending cer-
tification by the Board. This difference in treatment was based upon
the Board's belief that, unlike an unaffiliated, company-sponsored
241. No attempt will be made to document this practice here. It is ex-
plained and documented in Carpenter Steel Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 104, 21
LRRM 1232, 1233; Detroit Edison Co., (1947) 74 NLRB 267, 278-9; Cox,
supra note 3 at 22-24.
242. Three days before the final enactment of LMIMA the Board, in a
divided decision, withheld this drastic remedy for the first time, in a case in
which the unaffiliated union had been free from employer influence for three
years. Detroit Edison Co., supra note 241.
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union, a union affiliated with a national organization "could not be
permanently and completely subjugated to the will of the em-
ployer.' 243
The Board's solution to the Congressional edict that affiliated
and unaffiliated unions must be treated alike was to recognize, in
effect, two degrees of violation of Section 8(a) (2) : (1) "Domi-
nation" of the organization would result in its permanent disestab-
lishment, whether affiliated or unaffiliated. (2) "Interference and
support," falling short of domination, would result only in an
order that recognition be withheld pending certification, whether
affiliated or not.24 4 Since "domination" of an affiliated union is like-
ly to be found on rare occasions, if ever, the result of this solution
would appear to be to leave substantially the same remedy in effect
in the case of affiliated unions, but to make possible a less severe
treatment of company or other unaffiliated unions when the sup-
port and interference has not been extensive enough to amount to
actual domination and control.2 45
Whether any substantial change from pre-amendment practice
will result from this answer to the Congressional command will
necessarily depend upon the Board's application of its new formula.
As if to guarantee its good faith, on the day it announced its for-
mula the Board decided two cases, both involving unaffiliated
unions; in one it found domination and ordered disestablishment, 24"
while in the other it found only support and interference and ordered
the lesser remedy.2 47 Since that day in mid-March, 1948, the Board
has decided several additional cases, all involving unaffiliated or-
ganizations. The total score to date is five findings of domination
with consequent disestablishment 24 as against two findings of
support and interference with orders not to recognize, pending cer-
tification..2 4 9
243. Carpenter Steel Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 104, 21 LRRMT 1232,
1233.
244. Id. at 1234.
245. The Board thought cases of "actual domination" of "any labor
organization" would be "perhaps few in number."Ibid. (italics the Board's).
There were five in the first month, all unaffiliated unions. See note 248 infra.
246. Ibid.
247. Hershey Metal Products Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 105, 21 LRRM
1237.
248. Carpenter Steel Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 104, 21 LRRM 1232;
Vogue-Wright Studios, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 111, 21 LRRM 1246;
Rathbun Molding Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 149, 21 LRRM 1277; Pacific
Moulded Products Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 164, 21 LRRM 1328; Kresge
Dept. Store, (1948) 77 NLRB No. 25, 21 LRRM 1345.
249. Hershey Metal Products Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 105, 21 LRRM
1237; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 123, 21 LRRM 1255.
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No nice formula for distinguishing between the death-dealing
domination and the non-lethal interference and support has been
attempted by the Board, nor does one seem possible. The decision
in any case must depend on the composite result of a number of
factors, tempered with good judgment as to whether the organiza-
tion is free of employer control and domination. The decisions find-
ing domination seemed most influenced by the following factors:
(1) Participation by the employer in the formation of the organiza-
"tion.250 (2) Participation by the employer or his supervisors in the
organization's meetings and activities.251 (3) Cessation and revival
of organization activity at will of the employer.2 5 2 (4) Ability of
employer to unseat any elected "representative" of the employees
by discharging or transferring him to another department. 253 (5)
No meetings of employees with their "representatives" and no
right to participate in the organization affairs except by annual
election of a representative.2 5 4 (6) Lack of independent means of
financial support.22 , 5 (7) Meetings held on company time, and em-
ployees paid for time in attendance and time devoted to other or-
ganization activities. 256 (8) Recognition of the organization as the
bargaining agent without requiring proof of majority status..2 5 7
In the decisions finding only interference and support, the fol-
lowing factors seemed important as indicating lack of domination:
(1) Inception and organization of the union by the employees
themselves, without employer participation. 25 8 (2) Refusal of the
union to delay a strike as requested by employer, with consequent
settlement resulting in wage increase.2 59 (3) Refusal to accept em-
ployer's offer of company attorney's assistance in formation of
organization, and consultation with attorney of employees' own
choice contrary to employer's advice.2 60 (4) Freedom of another
250. Vogue-Wrright Studios, Inc.; Rathbun Molding Corp.; Pacific
Moulded Products Co.; Kresge Dept. Store; all cited note 248 supra.
251. Vogue-Wright Studios, Inc.; Kresge Dept. Store; cited note 248
supra.
252. Carpenter Steel Co., supra note 248; cf. Pacific Moulded Products
Co., supra note 248 (no meetings ever held or officers chosen).
253. Carpenter Steel Co., supra note 248.
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid. Cf. Rathbun Molding Corp., supra note 248 (employer pres-
sure to get signed check-off slips).
256. Ibid.; Vogue-.Vright Studios, Inc., supra note 248; cf. Rathbun
Molding Corp., supra note 248 (election of officers and counting of ballots on
company time).
257. Carpenter Steel Co., supra note 248.
258. Hershey Metal Products Co., supra note 249.
259. Ibid.
260. Ibid.
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union of similar company-sponsored ancestry from domination, as
indicated by its joining a CIO national labor organization.261
Free Speech Provision
Section 8(c) amends the original Act to add the following:
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof ... shall not constitute or be the evidence of
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit."
In view of the greatly increased liberality of the Board toward
the employer's freedom to express anti-union views during the year
preceding this amendment, little basic change was to be expected
in the decisions on interference and coercion arising out of em-
ployer's anti-union propaganda campaigns. 262 In the main, this seems
borne out by the decisions, but the amendment has had the imme-
diate and obvious effect of focusing attention on the necessity of
finding a "threat of reprisal or force or a promise of benefit. '261
Such threat or promise is not required where the forbidden inter-
ference or coercion consists of conduct other than expressions of
views, arguments and opinion, such as interrogating employees
about union affiliation, 26 4 or circulation of anti-union petitions.2 15
But where the basis for finding coercion is only the expression of
anti-union views and opinions, the forbidden threat or promise
must be found.
A number of cases have turned on the presence or absence of a
threat or promise. A threat to close the plant in case the union
wins,2-0 0 or the promise of favorable individual contracts if the
261. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 249.
262. Cox, supra note 3 at 15-20 presents a careful analysis of this pro-
vision in the light of the pre-amendment background of Board and court
decisions, and the legislative history.
263. See NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron and Brass Works, (C.C.A. 2d
1947) 165 F. 2d 660, 662 (pre-amendment Board order forbidding coercion
in background of highly derogatory anti-union remarks enforced with ex-
planation that it would be interpreted as only forbidding "threats, intimida-
tion, or promises").
264. Ames Spot Welder Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 45, 21 LRRM 1040.
265. R. J. Lovvorn, doing business as Georgia Twine & Cordage Co.,
(1948) 76 NLRB No. 12, 21 LRR11 1149; Kentucky Utilities Co., (1948)
76 NLRB No. 121, 21 LRRM 1259.
266. Unique Ventilation Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 41, 21 LRRM 1029;
Chamberlain Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 138, 21 LRRM 1122. The Unique
case also involved a threat not to carry out plans for veteran "on the job
training," and the Chamberlain case involved a threat to withhold a promised
wage increase. But cf. Bluefield Garment Manufacturers, (1947) 75 NLRB
No. 56, 21 LRRM 1047 (threat to close plant, unless union solicitation during
working hours stopped, held protected free speech).
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union is deserted, 26 7 are obviously coercive conduct outside the
protection of Section 8(c). On the othe hand, extremely vigorous,
virulent and even vicious attacks on the union have been held
within the protection of this section, when no threat of reprisal
could fairly be implied, 26 s even though addressed to a "captive
audience. ' ' 26 8a Indeed the argumentation may be so forceful and
effective as to require the setting aside of an election for interference
with the "free and untrammeled choice" of the workers, and still
not constitute an unfair labor practice because threats and promises
are carefully avoided.269
The Board has read Section 8(c) to permit a finding of inter-
ference and coercion when a veiled threat can be implied, even
though express threats are carefully avoided. Thus, the statement
by the employer's superintendent that so far as he was concerned
there never would be a union around any company where he worked
was held in a three to two decision to be a veiled threat of reprisal
against any employee engaged in union activity. 270 The absence of
any assurance to the employees that they were free to join or not
to join a union was given some weight in this finding,2 71 as was
the presence of other acts of interference and a discriminatory dis-
charge..2 72 The Board distinguished an earlier decision holding non-
coercive a foreman's remark that if the union came in he would
267. Peoples Motor Express v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 4th 1948) 165 F. 2d
903; cf. Bailey Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 113, 21 LRRM 1112 (promise of
more generous vacation plan and other benefits).
268. General Shoe Corp., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 18, 21 LRRM 1337;
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, (1948) 75 NLRB No. 111, 21 LRRf 1124 (fore-
man's statements that anyone who joins the union is "nothing more or less
than a cut-throat, gangster and an outlaw" and he hoped to see them starve
to death); Bailey Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 113, 21 LRRM 1112.
268a. Babcock & Wilcox Co., (May 13, 1948) 77 NLRB No. 96, 22
LRRM 1057, overruling Clark Bros. Co., (1946) 70 NLRB 802 in reliance
on free speech clause.
269. General Shoe Corp., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 18, 21 LRRM 1337,
considered pp. 708-9 supra on this point.
270. West Ohio Gas Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 27, 21 LRRM 1156.
The dissenting opinion did not intimate that the Board could not find an
implied threat in a proper case, but interpreted the superintendent's statement
differently from the majority.
271. See 21 LRRM 1158.
272. Ibid. This is the only intimation thus far that the so-called "totality
of conduct" doctrine may still be applied to read unspoken threats or promises
into the employer's anti-union remarks, because of other conduct which gives
meaning to the words which they would not have standing alone. In an
earlier case, the Board carefully pointed out that its finding of interference
was based solely on promises of economic benefits and not on the "course
of conduct theory." See Bailey Co., (1948) 75 NLRB No. 113, 21 LRRM 1112.
For a discussion of this theory, and its application to Section 8(c) see
Cox, supra note 3 at 17-18. The Congressional intent appears equivocal on
this point. Id. at 18.
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go out ;*7 obviously there is a vast difference between a foreman
threatening to leave and threatening reprisal against union em-
ployees. In another case an employer's poll of his employees, after
an anti-union speech, as to whether the employer should "step out
completely and let the business go on its own power," was held to
convey the threat that he would shut down the business if the em-
ployees chose the union..2 74 Though there will be close cases in
which neither the Board members, nor commentators, can agree
as to the presence of an implied threat or promise, the Board must
have power to control such veiled coercion if its power over threats
and promises is to be effective.2 7 5
No Board opinion has been found which concerned itself with
the far-reaching provision in Section 8(c) which prohibits the
Board from receiving as evidence of any unfair labor practice an
expression of anti-union opinion, however violent, unless it con-
tains the required threat or promise. Professor Cox has pointed out
the important effect this provision can have when the employer's
expressions of opinion might otherwise throw light on the motive
for ambiguous conduct, such as the discharge of employees.2 7 6
Chairman Herzog has indicated that such evidence has been elimi-
nated from consideration in accordance with the Act.2 77
The effect of this "free speech" provision on union unfair labor
practices has not arisen in any Board decisions; indeed, there have
been no Board decisions on any union unfair labor practices. But
in a temporary injunction proceeding brought by the Board and
dismissed because the court found insufficient effect on interstate
commerce, the federal district court added the comment that black-
listing a non-union contractor on the unfair list at the Building
Trades Council headquarters was a protected expression of "views,
arguments or opinion" within Section 8(c) .278 While the court was
without authority to make a final ruling on the merits, 279 the opinion
does indicate one of the possible applications of this section to union
activities. Is placing a non-union contractor's name on the union
headquarter's "unfair" list to be considered merely an expression
273. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 28, 21 LRRMV
1022.
274. Alliance Rubber Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 82, 21 LRRM 1221.
275. See Cox, supra note 3 at 17-18.
276. Id. at 19-20.
277. See address at Univ. of Minn., (1947) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRMI)
37, 38.
278. Sperry v. Denver Building Trades Council, (D. Colo. 1948) 21
LRRM 2712, 2717.
279. It found that the challenged conduct did not "affect" interstate
commerce.
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of opinion, or, when coupled with an understanding that union men
will not work on the same job with non-union men, is to be viewed
as implementing or inducing a concerted refusal to perform services
in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) ? It would seem that the "veiled
threat" approach used in the employer speech cases might be ap-
plied here to find a thinly veiled direction to union men to put
"operation boycott" into effect.
Discharge "For Cause"
Section 10(c) of the amended Act contains the following sen-
tence:
"No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any
individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged,
or the payment to him of back pay, if such individual was sus-
pended or discharged for cause."
There never has been any question of the employer's right to dis-
charge his employee for proper cause, such as unsatisfactory work
or infraction of shop rules enforced against other employees, but
the issue often arises as to whether the cause given was, in fact,
the real cause of the discharge or a mere pretext to justify dis-
charge for union activity.280 Dissatisfaction with possibly over-
zealous Board decisions on such issues led to this enunciation by
Congress of the right of the employer to discharge for cause.2"'
Only one genuinely serious question is raised by the amend-
ment. May the Board properly infer, as in the past, that a discharge
was for union activity even though a proper ground for the dis-
charge has been fully established and stated by the employer as the
reason for his action? No discussion of. this question has come from
the Board as yet, but the General Counsel has stated his views
as follows:
"As I see it, 'good cause,' as the basis of a discharge, must be
just as good under the provisions of this Act as it ever has been
... We are still not only entitled to, but are obligated to, weigh
the bona fides of the so-called 'good cause' and to reject the 'good
cause' theory if it has all the earmarks of nothing but subterfuge." 282
The General Counsel illustrated his point by reference to the typical
case of discharge for a relatively minor offense, previously passed
over without disciplinary action until the employee involved hap-
280. This issue was recognized in the initial NLRB case in the Supreme
Court. See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., (1947) 301 U. S. 1,
45-46.
281. An excellent discussion of the background and legislative history of
this amendment appears in Cox, supra note 3, at 20-22.
282. Address before St. Louis Bar Ass'n, 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM)
10, 11.
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pened to be an active union leader. In such cases of discrimina-
tion the Board has continued to find that the discharge was for
union activity rather than the stated cause, and to require reinstate-
ment.' " It has also continued in many cases to find that the stated
cause for the discharge was not established by the employer.284
Whether it will go further and infer from circumstantial evidence,
other than discrimination, that a fully established justification and
stated reason for the discharge was not the real "cause" must await
further clarification.
One Board decision points to an obvious limitation on the scope
of the "for cause" provision. It is confined by its terms to the
corrective orders for reinstatement and back pay, and hence im-
poses no limitation on preventative orders to cease and desist future
discrimination or coercion by suspensions or discharges. 2 5 This
limitation will make little difference so long as the provision is
given a reasonable interpretation which permits the Board to find
that the discharge was not for the cause stated, when the evidence
justifies that conclusion. But if an unforeseeably strict interpreta-
tion is given the provision by the courts, the Board can at least
fall back on cease and desist orders to guard against future dis-
charges.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, has interpreted
this "for cause" provision to have reference to the particular cause
for discharging the particular employee, not to a general cause,
such as business curtailment for economic reasons.28 6 On reduction
of operations the employees involved were discharged in the ratio
of 12 union men to 1 non-union man, although the total plant ratio
was approximately 2 to 1. In a pre-amendment order the Board
found discrimination and ordered reinstatement. In enforcing this
order, the court rejected the employer's contention that the em-
ployees were discharged "for cause" due to the business curtailment,
283. See, e.g., O'Keefe & Merritt Mfg. Co., doing business as Pioneer
Electric Co., (1947).75 NLRB No. 14, 21 LRRM 1006. Contrast Colonial
Life Ins. Co., (1948)' 76 NLRB No. 102, 21 LRRM 1230 where absence of
discrimination was stressed.
284. See, e.g., Ames Spot \Welder Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 45, 21
LRRM 1040; C. F. Fellows, doing business as American Patrol Service,
(1947) 75 NLRB No. 79, 21 LRRM 1068; West Ohio Gas Co., (1948) 76
NLRB No. 27, 21 LRRM 1156.
285. Briggs 'Mfg. Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 65, 21 LRRM 1056. This
case involved discrimination in violation of Section 8(a) (4), but the same
principle would apply to violations of Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3).
286. NLRB v. Sandy Hill Iron and Brass Works, (C.C.A. 2d 1947)
165 F. 2d 660. Though the matter is not discussed, the Court apparently con-
sidered the "for cause" restriction on reinstatement and back pay orders to
apply to court enforcement of pre-amendment Board orders.
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and ruled that the statutory "cause" must relate to the reason for
selecting the particular employees for discharge.
Collective Bargaining on Pensions and Insurance
In a significant decision on April 12, 1948, the Board ruled for
the first time that the duty to bargain collectively includes a duty
to bargain on pension plans and retirement benefits.2 87 The Board's
broad conclusion was that the statutory subject of collective bar-
gaining, "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other con-
ditions of employment," 2 8 should be construed to include "emolu-
ments of value, like pension and insurance benefits, which may ac-
crue to employees out of their employment relationship." 29 The
amended Act did not change the pertinent terms of the statute, but
the Board laid stress on the legislative history of the amended Act
as indicating a deliberate refusal by the Congress to narrow the
terms of the Act for fear it would result in excluding such bene-
fits.2 90 Another case is now pending in which the issue is whether
an employer must bargain on group insurance benefits, and a fed-
eral district court has restrained the employer from putting such a
plan into effect without bargaining, pending the Board decision. 1,
In another fringe situation, the Board's order requiring collective
bargaining on merit increases, and forbidding the granting of any
such increases without consultation with the union, was upheld
and enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
2 2
Unfair Labor Practices by Labor Organizations
No Board decisions have dealt with the unfair labor practices
by labor organizations forbidden by Section 8(b) of the amended
Act. 292 Many such cases are pending,294 and in a number of in-
287. Inland Steel Co., (1948) 77 NLRB No. 1, 21 LRRM 1310.
288. See Section 9(a). Section 8(a) (5) makes refusal to bargain "sub-
ject to the provisions of Section 9(a)" an unfair labor practice.
289. Inland Steel Co., supra note 287, 21 LRRM at 1311.
290. See id. at 1313-14.
291. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 21 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (LRRM) 141.
292. NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., (C.C.A. 6th 1948) 165 F. 2d 766.
293. The union unfair labor practices created by Section 8(b) have been
analyzed in the light of the precedents in the employer unfair labor prac-
tices cases by Foley, Union Unfair Labor Practices Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, (1947) 33 Va. L. Rev. 697; cf. Note (1948) 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 13.
In two instances the Board has ruled that Section 10(c) of the amended Act
does not authorize back pay orders against a union for procuring the discrimi-
natory discharge of an employee prior to the effective date of the amendment.
E. L. Bruce Co., (1947) 75 NLRB No. 62, 21 LRRM 1044; General Electric
X-Ray Corp., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 11, 21 LRRM 1150.
294. On March 18, 1948, 420 charges of union unfair labor practices had
been filed. One-third of these were on charges of secondary boycotts. Out of
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stances temporary injunctions or restraining orders have been
secured in the federal district courts enjoining such unfair labor
practices pending determination of the issue by the Board. These
Court decisions will be reviewed briefly below,2 95 but will not be
considered in detail because they are tentative in nature, based on
a finding of "probable" violation, pending Board decision of the
issue on the facts and the law,2 98 and the Board decisions will be
subject to review by the circuit courts of appeal rather than the
district courts.29 7 Clarification of this new class of unfair labor
practices must, therefore, await a series of Board decisions.
Union Security Provisions
No reported Board decisions have considered the substantive
features of the ban on the closed shop, or the requirement that a
union shop contract be approved by a majority vote of the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit.295 In one case a federal district
court issued a temporary injunction to restrain the International
Typographical Union's "no contract" policy aimed at achieving
closed shop conditions in the newspaper industry,299 but no Board
decision on this policy has yet been made. Despite this dearth of
formal decisions, a major function of the Board since the amended
Act became effective has been the supervision of union shop elec-
tions. Requests for such elections have constituted three-fourths
of all incoming cases, amounting to 3500 in the month of Febru-
ary alone, but most of the elections are conducted by consent and
require no action by the members of the Board in Washington.300
The most significant action taken thus far by the Board in ap-
these 420 charges, only 24 complaints had been issued by the General Counsel
on March 18. See Address of Chairman Herzog, (1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep.(LRRM) 243, 245, 247 n. 21.
295. See pp. 726-28 infra.
296. See p. 725 infra.
297. See Sections 10(e) and 10(f).
298. See Sections 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(5). The approved
"union shop" contract can only require union membership as a condition of
employment on or after 30 days following the date of employment or the
date of the contract, whichever is later. The impact of those provisions is
discussed in Cox, supra note 3 at 291-99; Notes (1947) 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101,
110; (1943) 36 Geo. L. Jr. 198; (1948) 33 Ia. L. Rev. 539. Cf. Gilchrist
Lumber Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 177, 21 LRRI 1302 (ban on second
union shop election within 12 months, considered p. 706 supra).
299. Evans v. International Typographical Union, (S.D. Ind. 1948)
76 F. Supp. 881, considered p. 728 infra.
300. See Address by Chairman Herzog, (1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(LRRM) 243, 246. Up to January 31, 1948, 1682 elections were conducted.
The union shop was approved by a majority of the employees in all but 18
of these 1682 elections. See (1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 191, 192;
(1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 223.
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plying the union shop provisions of the Act has been in connection
with the construction industry. Because the average building trades
worker is employed by the same contractor for a comparatively
short time, a union shop election within a bargaining unit limited
to a particular employer was impracticable. Instead, the Board
decided to divide the nation into approximately 700 construction
areas, and to hold a single union shop election for each craft within
each area. All craft employees, excluding casuals and transients,
who work for contractors operating in the area will be eligible to
vote for or against authorizing their craft union to enter into union
shop agreements with the contractors in that area.3"1
Pending decisions by the Board on the union shop provisions,
some guidance may be found in the positions taken by the General
Counsel. Since he has "final authority" on the issuance of com-
plaints,30 2 his assurance that certain conduct does not constitute
an unfair labor practice would seem a relatively dependable guide
for his term of office, subject to a possible change of views. On the
other hand, his position that certain conduct will be considered an
unfair labor practice may not be followed by the Board, but his
warning would seem to assure those who ignore it the opportunity
to defend their conduct before the Board. In a series of policy an-
nouncements, the General Counsel has taken the following posi-
tions:
(1) Renewals of collective bargaining contracts may embody
a union shop clause without waiting for an election, so long as they
also provide that the union shop clause will take effect only after the
employees vote for it as required by the Act.30 3 Otherwise, un-
justified delays would occur in the renewal of contracts. The Gen-
eral Counsel reasoned that the law does not prohibit an employer
from committing himself in writing to a union shop agreement
which conforms to the law if the employees wish it, but pointed
out that such a provision is completely ineffective until the election
requirements have been met. This reasoning would appear to per-
mit such a union shop clause in a new contract, as well as a renewal,
301. See Address by General Counsel Denham, (1948) 21 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (LRRMT) 158; N. Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1948, p. 39, col. 3; Report of
Joint Committee on Labor -Management Relations, Sen. Rep. No. 986, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 25 (1948). The first in a series of "pilot" elections was
held May 10 in 33 counties of western Pennsylvania. See (1948) 22 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 15.
302. Section 3(d).
303. See Press Release, (1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 203.
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if it contains a proviso that it shall be effective only after approval
by a union shop election. 30°
(2) The automatic renewal of a pre-amendment contract with
a union shop clause is subject to the statutory requirement of a
union shop election. It "is the same in that respect as a new con-
tract," and is not effective until approved by the employees. 30
(3) The required union shop election must be conducted by
the Board; an election supervised by any other organization is
completely ineffective to meet the Act's requirements.306
(4) Once a labor organization wins authority for a union shop
by an election, such authority is retained until (a) it is revoked b)
a vote of the employees under Section 9(e) (2), or (b) the unior
is displaced by another bargaining agent.30 7 Thus it is not necessar 3
for a union to obtain a renewal of the authority each time a nev
contract is negotiated.
(5) In his capacity to process petitions for union shop elections
on behalf of the Board,30 8 the General Counsel has ruled that no
union shop elections will be held in states which make the union
shop illegal. This decision was approved by the Board in a 3 to 2
decision in May, 1948.309
304. The General Counsel's office has indicated that the mere entry
into a union shop contract not authorized by an election is in itself interference
and coercion in violation of Section 8(a) (1) even though no action is taken
under it to discharge a non-union employee. See address by Associate General
Counsel Brooks, Analysis, 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 81, 82 (Mar. 15,
1948).
305. Id. at 81. A federal district court so ruled in a declaratory judg-
ment involving a contract automatically renewed after the effective date.
District Lodge v. Akmadzich, (S.D. Calif. May 6, 1948) 22 LRRM 2095.
306. See address by Associate General Counsel Brooks, (1948) 21
Lab. Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 217.
307. Id. at 218.
308. The Board has delegated to the General Counsel authority to
process on its behalf all petitions filed pursuant to Section 9, with the privilege
of appeal to the Board from dismissal of a petition by the General Counsel.
See NLRB-General Policy, .(1948) 13 Fed. Reg. 654, 21 LRRM 3007.
309. Giant Food Shopping Center, (1948) 77 NLRB No ...... 22 LRRM%
1070. See address, supra note 306 at 218. The decision depends on the inter-
pretation of Section 14(b) :
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execu-
tion or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Terri-
tory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law."
The issue is whether this section is to be considered as prohibiting union shop
agreements when contrary to state law, thus placing the NLRA enforce-
ment procedure back of the state policy, or is to be considered as merely
permitting the state law to control despite the authorization of a union shop
by a federally supervised election. Cf. Report of joint Committee on Labor
Management Relations, Sen. Rep. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 31-32
(1948). In eleven states union shops are now unlawful. See Tabular Analysis
of State Labor Law Provisions (1948) 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. 312, 313-14.
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The Use of Injunctions to Control Unfair Labor Practices
The original Act provided for enforcement of Board orders by
circuit courts of appeal.3 10 Such court orders were expressly freed
from the limitations of the Norris LaGuardia Act.31' These pro-
visions were retained in the amended Act and became applicable
to unions as well as to employers. The innovation of the amended
Act is in its provisions for temporary injunctive relief prior to the
Board decision in two situations, with nothing said about the Nor-
ris LaGuardia Act:
(1) Section 10(j) gives the Board permissive authority, after
issuing an unfair labor practice complaint, to petition the federal
district court for "appropriate temporary relief or restraining or-
der." The Court is authorized to grant such temporary relief "as it
deems just and proper." This power has been exercised only three
times, once against an employer and twice against a union.a' 2
(2) If there is "reasonable cause," after a preliminary investi-
gation, to believe a charge of violating the so-called secondary boy-
cott provisions313 is true, and that a complaint should issue, Section
10(1) imposes on Board officers a mandatory duty to petition the
federal district court for "appropriate injunctive relief pending the
final adjudication of the Board." The court is authorized to grant
"such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems
just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law." Such
relief has been sought on ten reported occasions, and injunctive re-
lief granted in seven of them. 1
Procedural Rulings
Relief has been granted under Sections 10(j) 815 and 10(l)11
-upon a finding that there is "reasonable probability" or "reasonable
310. Section 10(e).
311. Section 10(h).
312. See p. 728 infra.
313. Charges of a violating Section 8(b) (4) (A) (B) and (C) are in-
cluded. The latter forbids an attempt to force 'any employer" to bargain
with or recognize a labor organization when another has been certified.
Thus the cases covered are slightly broader than the so-called secondary
boycotts.
314. See pp. 726-28 infra.
315. Evans v. International Typographical Union, (S.D. Ind. 1948)
76 F. Supp. 881, 885 ("the standard of inquiry ... is the probability of the
existence of the facts") ; id. at 2553 (injunction issued on this basis) ; Douds
v. Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., (N.D. N.Y. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 414,
418 ("reasonable probability").
316. Ibid.; Barker v. Local 1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
etc., (M.D. Ala. 1948) .... F. Supp. ...., 21 LRRM 2406, 2407 ("reason-
able cause to believe) ; Sperry v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc.,(D. Kan. 1948) .... F. Supp ...... 21 LRRM 2244, 2245 (same).
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cause to believe" that the defendant is engaged in the alleged un-
fair labor practices. The Courts have recognized that they are
granting temporary relief pending final determination of the issues
by the Board.31 7 One court has taken the position that the "common
law" requirements of irreparable injury and lack of an adequate
remedy at law do not apply so long as the statutory requirements
are met.' s Another has ruled that, though not a statutory require-
ment, the likelihood of "'substantial and irreparable injury' ...
should serve as a guide and norm to the court when interpreting
and applying what it 'deems just and proper.'-319 Several have indi-
cated that the purpose of the injunctive relief is protection of the
public interest as distinct from the employer's private interest, and
have thus looked for substantial or irreparable harm to the public
as the determinative factor in granting320 or withholding relief.
32
'
The courts have recognized that the injunctive jurisdiction grant-
ed by Sections 10(1)32 -2 and 10(j) 32 3 is not subject to the Norris
LaGuardia Act. Even though there is no express waiver of that
Act for such injunctions, as there is under the earlier provision
for enforcing Board orders, one court reasoned "when the Court
is given jurisdiction without limitation, the Act means just that. '324
Fruitless, also, was an attack on the constitutionality of this injunc-
tive power on the ground that it did not involve a "case or con-
troversy" and conferred administrative functions on the courts.
317. All opinions cited in notes 315 and 316 make this recognition, but
the Evans and Doud opinions contain the best discussion of this function of
the Courts. See also Styles v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
etc., (E.D. Tenn. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 499, 501.
318. Douds v. Local 294, Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, (N.D. N.Y.
1947) 75 F. Supp. 414, 418.
319. Douds v. Wine Workers Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 21 LRRM
2204, 2205; cf. later opinion 75 F. Supp. 447, 452.
320. Id. at 75 F. Supp. 452; Douds v. Int. Longshoremen's Ass'n, (N.D.
N.Y. 1947) 20 LRRMxf 2642; Sperry v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
supra note 316; cf. Evans v. International Typographical Union, (S.D. Ind.
1948) 76 F. Supp. 881, 886, 893 (irreparable injury to both public and private
interests).
321. Cf. Styles v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc.,
(E.D. Tenn. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 499, 501 (to justify injunction situation should
disclose some "immediate urgency of action" for temporary protection to
rights of citizens).
322. Barker v. Local 1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc.,
(M.D. Ala. 1948) .... F. Supp ..... 21 LRRM 2406, 2408; Le Baron v. Print-
ing Specialties, etc., Union, (S.D. Calif. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 678, 681; Douds
v. Local 294, Int Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., (N.D. N.Y. 1947) 75
F. Supp. 414, 418.
323. Ibid.
324. Ibid. The quoted statement was in response to the contention that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to Section 10(j) since it did not contain
the phrase "notwithstanding any other provisions of the law" found in Sec-
tion 10(1).
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The court ruled that the granting of interlocutory relief, pending
final decision of the unfair labor practice issue by the Board, was
essentially judicial in character, and final and conclusive on the
judicial issue of interlocutory relief, subject only to review on ap-
peal.3
25
Substantive Rulings
All ten cases under the mandatory Section 10(l) were brought
to enjoin so-called secondary boycotts in violation of Section 8(b)
(4) (A) .32- The seven cases in which relief was granted all involved
refusal to perform services, or inducing such refusal, where the ob-
ject was to force the immediate employer to cease doing business
with some other person with whom the union had a primary dispute.
In three of the cases the employees struck, or were called off the
job, because the employer refused to cease doing business with a
non-union firm.8 27 In three cases employees were induced by picket-
ing, or encouraged or directed through union channels, to refuse
to handle, transport or work on the products of a plant at which a
strike had been called because of a dispute on wages and condi-
tions of employment. 3 2 In one case the dispute arose out of a
325. Evans v. International Typographical Union, (S.D. Ind. 1948) 76
F. Supp. 881, 885. Two other grounds of attack were also rejected: (1)
The claim that due process was violated by granting an interlocutory
injunction in a proceeding in which the court could not compel a final
decision by the Board. (2) The claim that the Board had improperly dele-
gated its power to seek injunctive relief under Section 10(j) to the regional
director.
326. Section 8(b) (4) (A) provides as follows:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person."
327. Douds v. Local 294, InternationM Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc.,
(N.D. N.Y. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 414 (strike against express company because
it leased equipment to non-union company) ; Douds v. Local 294, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., (N.D. N.Y. 1947) 21 LRRM 2154
(refusal to transport company's goods because it allowed non-union truck-
ing concern access to its docks; no additional injunction actually issued on
ground that the one issued in the first case would be sufficient; for facts
not appearing in opinion see Report of Joint Committee on Labor Manage-
ment Relations, Sen. Rep. 986, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 17 (1948) ; Barker v.
Local 1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., (M.D. Ala. 1948)
...... F. Supp ....... 21 LRRM 2406 (union carpenters called out of department
store to force it to cease doing business with non-union contractor).
328. LeBaron v. Printing Specialties, etc., Union, (S.D. Calif. 1948)
75 F. Supp. 678 (picketing caused employees of transportation companies
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struggle between longshoremen and teamsters for the business of
transporting loaded truck trailers between Albany and New York.
When the teamsters threatened to interfere with plans to carry the
trailers on converted LST's unless they received stand-by pay, the
longshoremen sought to force the shippers to cease doing business
with the truck drivers, and use LST's instead, by calling a general
strike against all shippers at the Albany port.8 29 In each case tem-
porary injunctive relief was granted, although in one case the
restraining order was later dissolved when there was no longer
any danger that the forbidden practices would resume. 80
In three cases injunctive relief was denied but without question-
ing its propriety when appropriate. In one the Court found it had
no jurisdiction because the effect on interstate commerce was too
indirect.33' In another the union men had been called off a con-
struction job using non-union men prior to the effective date of
the Act, and the Court ruled that the Act did not forbid a con-
tinued refusal to perform services if the initial refusal com-
menced before its effective date.132 In the third case the Court
construed Section 8(b) (4) (A) as intended to protect only
"neutrals" and "innocent bystanders" who are "wholly unconcerned
in the disagreement between the employer and his employees."
Hence, it held that the Act did not forbid a union out on strike
- from picketing a firm to which the employer's work was sub-
contracted on a much larger scale than before the strike, under
the circumstances pointing to such a- close alliance between the
to cease handling hot cargo) ; Sperry v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
etc., (D. Kan. 1948) .... F. Supp ...... 21 LRRM 2244 (union prevented mem-bers from working for contractor who erected prefabricated houses built by
manufacturer with whom wage dispute existed; for facts not appearing in
opinion see Report of Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations,
Sen. Rep. 9,6, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 17 [1948]) ; Douds v. Wine Workers
Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1947) 21 LRRM 2120 (affiliated union directed its mem-
bers, who were employees of distributors of the struck distillery, to cease
handling the distillery's products). In the latter case the temporary re-
straining order was subsequently dissolved when it appeared that the primary
strike was ended and the objectionable practices had ceased. 75 F. Supp. 447.
329. Douds v. International Longshoremen's Association, (N.D. N.Y.
1947) 20 LRRM 2642. For facts not appearing in opinion see Report of
Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, Sen. Rep. 986, 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess., p. 16 (1948).
330. Douds v. Wine Workers Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 447.
See note 328 supra for further details.
331. Sperry v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, (D.
Colo.) 21 LRRM 2712.
332. Styles v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., (E.D.
Tenn. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 499. The court also reasoned that the case was moot
because the construction in issue had been completed, and there was no indi-
cation that similar future conduct was likely.
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two firms as to prevent a conclusion that the picketed firm had no
interest in the labor dispute.333
None of the cases considered the impact of the free speech
guarantee of Section 10 (c) on an injunction against picketing,
but one court ruled that the constitutional guarantee of free
speech was not infringed by enjoining a picket line against two
transportation companies carrying goods from a struck plant.334
It reasoned that such picketing was not the mere dissemination of
information but was a type of "coercion" or "forcible technique"
harmful to the interests of two strangers to the labor dispute.33 5
As previously mentioned, another of the opinions reasoned that
placing a non-union contractor on the union "unfair" list in union
headquarters is protected free speech within the terms of Section
10(c), but the decision was rested on another ground.338
All three cases brought under the permissive Section 10(j)
resulted in injunctive relief. In one, a temporary restraining order
was issued to prevent an employer, who was refusing to bargain
with the certified union on a group insurance plan, from putting the
plan into effect. 337 In another, a secondary boycott was enjoined.33,
In the third, the International Typographical Union was enjoined
from encouraging or directing its local unions (1) to refuse to
bargain in good faith for a definite term in accordance with the
custom in the newspaper industry, or (2) to refuse to incorporate
any agreement reached into a written contract, or (3) to give effect
to any policy which would discriminate against employees because
of non-membership in the union except as permitted by the union
shop provisions of the Act.3 39 This temporary injunction -was aimed
at the ITU "no contract" policy by which it sought to achieve closed
shop conditions by posted conditions of employment, and at its
alternative policy of entering into contracts with sixty-day termina-
tion clauses by which the same object was to be achieved.
333. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, etc., (S.D. N.Y.
1948) 75 F. Supp. 672.
334. LeBaron v. Printing Specialties, etc., Union, (S.D. Calif. 1948)
75 F. Supp. 678.
335. Id. at 682. The court relied on Carpenters and Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, (1942) 315 U. S. 722; cf. Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl,
(1942) 315 U. S. 769.
336. Sperry v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, supra
note 331.
337. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1948) 21 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (LRRM) 141. See p. 720 for related problems.
338. Douds v. Local 294, Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., (N.D.
N.Y. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 414, considered p. 726 supra. The petition was filed
under both Sections 10(j) and 10(1).
339. Evans v. International Typographical Union, (S.D. Ind. 1948)
76 F. Supp. 881.
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Private Actions for Injunction
Several attempts have been made, both by employers and by
unions, to secure injunctions in private actions against alleged viola-
tions of the LIMIRA. One of the cases brought by an employer was
based on Section 303 of the Act, which makes certain union con-
duct, including the so-called secondary boycott, "unlawful for the
purposes of this section only" and gives a cause of action for dam-
ages in the federal district court.3 40 An amendment to authorize
employers to secure injunctive relief in such cases was defeated in
the Senate,3"' and the sponsors of Section 303 explained that it
was not intended to authorize injunctions.34 Yet one federal dis-
trict court issued an injunction restraining a union from picketing
the plaintiff bus company's depot in an effort to force the company
to deny the use of its depot to another bus company with which the
union had a labor dispute.343 The court based its decision on the
danger of irreparable harm from the violation of Section 303 for
which the Act's remedy of money damages was not adequate.3 4  It
by-passed the Norris LaGuardia Act by reasoning that there was
no "labor dispute" between the plaintiff and the union,345 ignoring
the broad statutory meaning of that term.3 46 The decision seems
clearly contrary to the Congressional intent, and in error on its
ruling as to the Norris LaGuardia Act.347
Two cases brought by employers arose in a California state trial
court not subject to the Norris LaGuardia Act. In the first case
the court refused to enjoin unnamed violations of the LMRA,
reasoning that the Act's only remedies were the filing of unfair
labor charges with the Board and actions for damages under Sec-
tion 303. 348 It relied upon the legislative history above mentioned.
In the later decision the same court enjoined a union from picketing
in an effort to force an employer to agree to a closed shop in viola-
340. The "unlawful" conduct described in Section 303 is the same as
that designated as unfair labor practice by Section 8(b) (4). It is summarized
in note 360 infra.
341. 93 Cong. Rec. 4757, 4847 (1947).
342. 93 Cong. Rec. 4872 (1947).
343. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, etc., (W.D. Ark.
1947) 74 F. Supp. 952.
344. Id. at 957.
345. Ibid.
346. Section 13(a), 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29U. S. C. § 113 (a) (1940) ; cf.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., (1940)
311 U. S. 91 (picketing stores to force them to cease buying from price
cutting vendors with whom union had labor dispute held protected from
injunction by Norris-LaGuardia Act).
347. Cf. p. 731 infra.
348. Gerry v. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, (Calif.
Superior Court, Los Angeles, 1948) 21 LRRM 2209.
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tion of the Act.3 49 It distinguished its prior ruling on the ground
that the defendant union had not complied with the filing and affi-
davit requirements, and was therefore disqualified from seeking
any kind of remedy from the Board. Inability of the union to in-
voke the Act's remedies would seem irrelevant, since its remedies
were still available to the employer who could file unfair labor
charges against the non-complying union for violation of Section
8(b) (2).
On two occasions unions have sought to by-pass the Board and
secure injunctive relief against an employer's unfair labor prac-
tices. In the first case the federal district court overruled the inter-
vening NLRB's motion to dismiss and entered an order requiring
the employer to bargain collectively, but provided that the order
should terminate if the Board ruled against the union.350 In effect
this granted in a private action the temporary relief authorized by
Section 10(j) only on petition of the Board. This decision was re-
versed by the circuit court of appeals, which ruled that the remedies
provided by the Act were exclusive, and that the only remedy for
an employer's unfair labor practice is through the Labor Board. 3 1
A few days later another federal district court denied injunctive
relief sought by a union against an employer's refusal to bargain
and other unfair labor practices, ruling also that the Board had
exclusive jurisdiction.3 52
The circuit court of appeals reasoned that the plan of the Act
to establish a single, paramount administrative authority, with spe-
cialized skill and experience, to deal with the whole field of labor
relationships would be defeated if more than 200 district judges
were vested with powers over unfair labor practices.35 3 It noted
that the omission from the amended Act of the express provision
in the original Section 10(a) making the Board's powers over un-
fair labor practices "exclusive" was explained by the Conference
349. Simons v. Retail Clerks Union (California Superior Court, Los
Angeles, 1948) 21 LRRM 2685.
350. Textile Workers Union v. Amazon Cotton Mills, (M.D. N.C.
1948) 76 F. Supp. 159, 165.
351. Amazon Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers Union, (C.C.A. 4th
1948) 167 F. 2d 183.
352. International Longshoremens Union v. Sunset Line & Twine Co.,
(N.D. Calif. 1948) 21 LRRM 2635. In this case the union frankly argued
that the Court should protect it because it could not obtain relief from
the Board, due to failure to comply with the affidavit and reporting require-
ments. The argument was not received with sympathy. In the Amazon case,
supra note 351, the court noted the possibility of such use of private injunc-
tions as added reason for denying jurisdiction to issue them.
353. Amazon Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers Union, (C.C.A. 4th
1948) 167 F. 2d 183, 185-6.
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Committee's Report3" as intended to make allowance for the tem-
porary injunctions authorized by Sections 10(j) and 10(1) and
for the actions for damages against unions authorized under Section
303.1c It added that the meticulous limitation of the injunctive
power granted by Section 10(j) and 10(1) to suits filed by the
Labor Board negatives any Congressional intent to grant a general
power over injunctive relief to the district courts.156 It urged
that to recognize such general power would virtually repeal the
Norris LaGuardia Act,35 7 whereas the legislative history shows
no such intention but rather a refusal upon the part of Congress
to authorize injunctive relief even in the limited class of case cov-
ered by Section 303, and at least one reason for that refusal was
the desire to avoid a return to the abuses existing prior to the pas-
sage of the Norris LaGuardia Act.858
The court's position with respect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
is born out by dicta in a recent Supreme Court opinion,358 9 possibly
uttered to set the lower courts right on the impact of the LMRA
on that Act. Although the decision approved an injunction because
the case involved no "labor dispute" within the terms of the Act,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took pains to deny the argument that the
LMRA had removed the Norris-LaGuardia Act ban on injunctions
against "what are known as secondary boycotts":
"The short answer . . . is that the law has been changed only
where an injunction is sought by the National Labor Relations
Board, not where proceedings are instituted by a private party."
Private Actions for Damages
Section 301 authorizes actions for damages in federal district
courts against either employers or unions for violation of collective
bargaining contracts, and Section 303 authorizes actions for dam-
ages against unions for a limited class of unfair labor practices.3 60
In no reported cases have any judgments been entered in either
class of case, and only one case reports the bringing of such an
action.
354. See House Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 52 (1947).
355. See 167 F. 2d at 187.
356. Ibid.
357. Id. at 185.
358. Id. at 188-89.
359. Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, (1948) 68
S. Ct. 630, 632.
360. These may be roughly summarized as follows: (1) secondary boy-
cotts, (2) jurisdiction strikes, (3) strikes or picketing to force recognition
of or bargaining with a union when another has been certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative.
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In that one case,361 the employer brought an action against the
union for damages under Section 301 for calling a strike in viola-
tion of the terms of its contract, and under Section 303 for damages
as a result of a secondary boycott. On motion to dismiss, the district
court upheld the complaint against all attacks. Three rulings are of
interest: (1) It ruled that the contract clause calling for arbitra-
tion of disputes was intended to prevent strikes, not to require
arbitration of the claim for damages prior to bringing a Section 301
action, when the strike was called in violation of the contract. (2)
It ruled that the application of Section 301 to a contract entered into
prior to the effective date of the Act was not retrospective opera-
tion of the Act in violation of the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment, but prospective in operation, giving additional reme-
dies for future breach of existing contracts. (3) It ruled that it
would not consider the effect of the free speech guarantee of the
1st amendment on the secondary boycott prohibitions of Section
303, until the evidence had established the actual operation of the
Act and its impact on the particular facts of the case.
CONCLUSION
A report on the first eight months of operation under the
amended Act would be incomplete without reference to the extra-
ordinary burden of cases which it places on a single Board of five
members in Washington. The backlog of cases is continually in-
creasing,362 with the consequent delays8 3 in securing decisions,
361. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Company v. International Union
United Furniture Workers, (D. Md. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 493, affirmed (C.C.A.
4th,'May 3, 1948) 22 LRRM 2102.
362. See address of Chairman Herzog, (Mar. 18, 1948) 21 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (LRRMN) 243, 246-47, wherein he prophesies that many months like
record-breaking February, 1948, with 4,500 new cases "will soon inundate the
Board in Washington." During the first six months, 12,500 cases poured into
the regional offices, consisting of 2,800 petitions for representation elections,
nearly 2,000 charges of unfair labor practices, and many thousand petitions
for union shop elections, amounting to 3,500 for February alone. An esti-
mated 30,000 union shop elections are contemplated for the next fiscal year.
Most union shop elections are handled through the regional offices, and
Congress is now considering the elimination of these, [see, (1948) 22 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 10] but no solution is yet in sight for the balance of the
caseload. At the end of the first six months under the amended Act 40% of
the 4,000 Wagner Act cases pending when the amended Act became effec-
tive were still undecided. Ibid. On March 1, 1948, a total of 9,500 cases were
pending. See dissenting opinion of Chairman Herzog, Lidden White Truck
Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 165, 21 LRRM 1290, 1292. At the end of March,
1948, this backlog had increased to 12,150 cases. This consisted of 1,593 un-
fair labor practice charges, 1,845 representation petitions, 144 decertification
petitions, and 7,145 petitions for union shop elections. See (1948) 22 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (LRRM) 32.
363. At the end of the first six months, the General Counsel had issued
complaints in only 42 of the 2,000 charges of unfair labor practices. See
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both in unfair labor practice cases and in representation matters,
except for consent elections 6 4 handled at the regional level. This
growing backlog of cases seems destined for further increase by
the Board's assumption of jurisdiction over the retailing of auto-
mobiles, ¢5 and the possible avalanche of cases which may descend
on the Board if retailing of other commodities of extra-state origin
is taken over.363 Practical difficulties due to substantial variance be-
tween the federal and state labor acts make relief through cession
of power to state agencies unlikely,367 unless Congress is willing
to sacrifice uniformity for the advantages of local state administra-
tion.' s A more likely alternative would be for Congress to authorize
delegation of representation and unfair labor practice decisions to
the regional offices, subject to some discretionary power of review
in the Labor Board in Washington to insure substantial uniformity
of policy. Such decentralization would insure a uniform handling
of labor relations in all industries affecting commerce, and at the
same time permit more rapid decisions at the local level.
address of Chairman Herzog, supra note 362 at 247, n. 21. Assuming the
majority of the charges may not justify issuance of complaints, the lag is
nevertheless alarming. After eight months not one union unfair labor practice
case had progressed to the point of decision, though 420 charges were filed
against unions in the first six months and 24 complaints issued. Ibid. Likewise,
complaints are common of long delays in securing decisions on representation
matters. Chairman Herzog deplores the delays but reports the Board has
found no satisfactory solution. Id. at 247.
364. See NLRB Procedures, Sec. 202.18, (1947) 12 Fed. Reg. 2654,
20 LRRMf 3112.
365. Liddon White Truck Co., (1948) 76 NLRB No. 165, 21 LRRM
1290 (Herzog and furdock dissenting because assumption of jurisdiction was
"administratively unwise"); Puritan Chevrolet, Inc., (1948) 76 NLRB
No. 180, 21 LRRM 1309 (Herzog and Murdock express no dissent, deciding
case on authority of Liddon White case).
366. This danger seems now averted by a decision on May 13, 1949,
not to assume jurisdiction over a chain of retail grocery stores operating in
one state. The decision was based frankly on policy grounds, rather than on
lack of effect on commerce, and the automobile cases were distinguished on
the ground that none of the goods came to the grocery directly across state
lines and none of its sales were made to out of state customers. Hon-ond Food
Stores, (1948) 77 NLRB No. 101, 22 LRRM 1064.
367. See an excellent consideration of this question in Boudin, Super-
sedure and the Purgatory Oath under the Taft-Hartley Act, (1948) 23
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 72, 76-79. See also authorities and cases cited note 7 supra.
368. The Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations at present
questions the desirability of amending the Act to permit inconsistent regu-
lations and policies under state administration. See Sen. Rep. No. 986, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 31 (1948).
1948]
